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Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law
Abstract

The May 2016 enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), which created a new federal civil
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, raises a host of issues that federal courts will have to
consider under their original subject matter jurisdiction, rather than applying state law through the courts’
diversity jurisdiction. This means that for the first time, an extensive body of federal jurisprudence will be
developed to govern the civil protection and enforcement of trade secrets in the United States. In addition,
due to the DTSA’s changes to the existing federal criminal law governing trade secrets, the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), federal courts will be required to further develop their EEA jurisprudence.
Because the DTSA is modeled after and includes many provisions taken directly from the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA), it is widely anticipated that federal courts will consult and rely upon existing case law
regarding the UTSA to decide how to apply the DTSA. However, nothing in the DTSA’s language mandates
such an approach, and federal courts may elect to depart from state law precedent in some situations.
Moreover, there are unique aspects of the DTSA, such as the ex parte seizure provision and protection for
whistleblowers, which will raise questions of first impression for the federal courts. Additionally, because
preexisting provisions of the EEA will be subject to greater scrutiny due to the number of civil cases that are
likely to be filed under the DTSA, unresolved issues under the EEA are also likely to be extensively litigated.
While it is premature to catalogue all the issues that litigants may raise in trade secret cases brought under the
DTSA, this Article seeks to identify and analyze several major areas of anticipated dispute and to provide a
framework for resolving them. Part I begins with a brief introduction to U.S. trade secret law. Part II details the
origins and legislative history of the DTSA. Part III discusses the interpretive rules and methodologies that are
likely to govern federal courts’ development of a federal jurisprudence of trade secrecy, including the
circumstances under which they might rely upon existing state trade secret case law or instead develop a
“federal common law” of trade secrecy. Finally, Part IV examines how key provisions of the DTSA should be
interpreted in light of these rules and methodologies, organized into four subcategories: (1) “new” language in
the DTSA that does not appear in state trade secret laws; (2) language “borrowed” from the UTSA that is
defined by statute; (3) language “borrowed” from the UTSA that is not defined by statute; and (4) issues not
clearly addressed in either the DTSA or the UTSA. In doing so, this Article provides a framework for future
analysis of other provisions in the DTSA.
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TOWARD A FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
TRADE SECRET LAW
Sharon K. Sandeent & Christopher B. Seamantt

ABSTRACT
The May 2016 enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), which
created a new federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, raises a host
of issues that federal courts will have to consider under their original subject matter
jurisdiction, rather than applying state law through the courts' diversity jurisdiction. This
means that for the first time, an extensive body of federal jurisprudence will be developed
to govern the civil protection and enforcement of trade secrets in the United States. In
addition, due to the DTSA's changes to the existing federal criminal law governing trade
secrets, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), federal courts will be required to
further develop their EEAjurisprudence.
Because the DTSA is modeled after and includes many provisions taken directly from
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), it is widely anticipated that federal courts will
consult and rely upon existing case law regarding the UTSA to decide how to apply the
DTSA. However, nothing in the DTSA's language mandates such an approach, and federal
courts may elect to depart from state law precedent in some situations. Moreover, there are
unique aspects of the DTSA, such as the ex parte seizure provision and protection for
whistleblowers, which will raise questions of first impression for the federal courts.
Additionally, because preexisting provisions of the EEA will be subject to greater scrutiny
due to the number of civil cases that are likely to be filed under the DTSA, unresolved
issues under the EEA are also likely to be extensively litigated.
While it is premature to catalogue all the issues that litigants may raise in trade secret
cases brought under the DTSA, this Article seeks to identify and analyze several major
areas of anticipated dispute and to provide a framework for resolving them. Part I begins
with a brief introduction to U.S. trade secret law. Part II details the origins and legislative
history of the DTSA. Part III discusses the interpretive rules and methodologies that are
likely to govern federal courts' development of a federal jurisprudence of trade secrecy,
including the circumstances under which they might rely upon existing state trade secret
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case law or instead develop a "federal common law" of trade secrecy. Finally, Part IV
examines how key provisions of the DTSA should be interpreted in light of these rules and
methodologies, organized into four subcategories: (1) "new" language in the DTSA that
does not appear in state trade secret laws; (2) language "borrowed" from the UTSA that is
defined by statute; (3) language "borrowed" from the UTSA that is not defined by statute;
and (4) issues not clearly addressed in either the DTSA or the UTSA. In doing so, this
Article provides a framework for future analysis of other provisions in the DTSA.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In the annals of trade secret law, 2016 will either be seen as the year that
trade secrecy came of age and was recognized as a form of intellectual
property 1 protection on par with patent, copyright, and trademark law; an
unfortunate disruption and complication of trade secret jurisprudence; or

1. Internationally, the labeling of trade secrets as "intellectual property" is
controversial because of the right to exclude that typically flows from intellectual property
rights and the reluctance to create another form of exclusive rights. See Sharon K. Sandeen,
The Limits ofTrade Secret Law: Article 39 ofthe TRIPS Agreement and the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act on Which It Is Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2011). This may explain, in part, why the DTSA contains a provision that
states that trade secrets shall not be considered "intellectual property" for any other purpose
of federal law. See Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(g), 130 Stat. 376,
382 (2016); see also Eric Goldman, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Isn't an "Intellectual
Property" Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 541, 542 (2017) (explaining that while
this language "preserves the status quo" for website immunity from liability for third-party
content under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, it also "potentially affects
hundreds of other statutes").
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something in between. With the adoption of the Defend Trade Secrets Act
of 2016 (DTSA) by the U.S. Congress 2 and the EU Trade Secret Directive
by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 3 which
story is ultimately told will depend in significant part on how both pieces of
legislation are interpreted and applied by courts. Although proponents of
both laws argue they will create greater uniformity regarding trade secret
principles, it will take years of judicial decision-making (and in the EU,
statutory enactments by Member states as well) before we will know
whether that claim is fulfilled.
The May 11, 2016 enactment of the DTSA created a federal civil cause
of action for trade secret misappropriation for the first time. For over 175
years, state law governed civil trade secret principles in the United States,
first as common law (as expressed in the Restatement (First) of Torts), and
since 1979, principally through the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the
UTSA). 4 The UTSA is one of the most widely-adopted uniform laws,
having been enacted into law by forty-seven states, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. 5 While many assume that the principles governing
trade secrecy articulated in the UTSA (and in non-UTSA states, the
Restatements) will continue to apply to the DTSA, this is not a foregone
conclusion for the simple reason that federal courts are not bound to
interpret the DTSA in accordance with the UTSA. 6 Rather, courts will likely
look first to the language of the DTSA and Congress's intent in enacting it.
2. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
3. Council Directive 2016/943, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1 (EU).
4. For a comprehensive history of trade secret law in the United States, see Sharon
K. Sandeen, The Evolution ofTrade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They
Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010).
5. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 536-659 (2005)
[hereinafter UTSA]. The only states not to adopt the UTSA are New York, Massachusetts,
and North Carolina, although North Carolina has a statute that is very similar to the UTSA.
See N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 66-152 to 66-157 (1981). The most recent two states to adopt the
UTSA were New Jersey in 2012 and Texas in 2013. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-1 (West
2012); TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.001 (West 2013).
6. In her testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2015,
Sharon Sandeen suggested that the DTSA should be amended to include a provision
requiring that the DTSA be applied and interpreted in accordance with the commentary of
the UTSA, but no such amendment was made. Protecting Trade Secrets: The Impact of
Trade Secret Theft on American Competitiveness and Potential Solutions to Remedy This
Harm: Hearing on S. 1890 and HR. 3326 Before the Full S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l 14th
Cong. (2015) (statement of Sharon Sandeen, Professor of Law, Hamline University School
of Law), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-02-15%20Sandeen%20
Testimony.pdf. However, a small portion of the commentary with respect to reverse
engineering and independent development is included in the text of the DTSA. See 18
U.S.C. § 1839(6) (Supp. IV 2016).
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Next, courts will likely examine and apply a hierarchy of other sources to
both interpret the DTSA and fill its gaps. Whether these "other sources"
include the UTSA, its commentary, and state court decisions applying them
remains to be seen.
This Article analyzes the process federal courts will engage in to create,
for the first time, a federal jurisprudence of civil trade secret law. Because
the background and history of the DTSA's enactment are integral to its
interpretation and application, Part II begins with a legislative history of the
DTSA. Part III discusses the rules and methodologies that federal courts are
likely to employ to interpret and apply the DTSA. Because the DTSA does
not expressly address all issues that are likely to arise in trade secret cases,
federal courts will be required to fill gaps in the statute by either relying
upon existing state law or by creating so-called "federal common law."
How this is done is a complicated part of federal jurisprudence that, in some
cases, may lead federal courts to refer to the UTSA or to develop new
approaches to various issues. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the DTSA's
key provisions and analyzes how these interpretative rules and
methodologies should apply to each of them.

II.

THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL CIVIL CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION

This Part describes the circumstances that led to the creation of a federal
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. Because Professor
Sandeen previously wrote a detailed account of the background and history
of U.S. trade secret law, 7 this Part only briefly recounts that history with an
emphasis on the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Kewanee Oil, which
held that federal patent law did not preempt state-based protection for trade
secrets. Next, this Part covers the enactment of the Economic Espionage
Act (EEA) of 1996, which provided for federal criminal (but not civil)
liability for certain forms of trade secret misappropriation. Finally, it
examines the legislative history of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,
including significant changes to the legislation as it made its way through
Congress and the perspectives of both its proponents and opponents.

7. See generally Sandeen, supra note 4; see also Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative
Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 667, 673-76, 681-87 (2006) (discussing the common law development of trade secret
law in the United States).
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STATE LAW ORIGINS

Until the DTSA's passage, state law nearly exclusively governed trade
secrecy in the United States. 8 The common law of trade secrecy (or breach
of confidence law as it is known in the U.K. 9) originated in England in the
early 1800s as a way to protect against the disclosure of proprietary
manufacturing knowledge in an era ofmass industrialization. 10 The concept
then migrated to the United States beginning in 1837 in a case involving a
sale of a business and the failure ofthe seller/defendant to disclose his secret
process for making chocolate. 11 In 1868, the same court found that the
holder of a secret manufacturing process has a property interest "which a
court of chancery will protect against one who in violation of contract and
breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it
to third persons." 12 In the following decades, numerous state courts granted
relief for misappropriation of proprietary information based upon various
common law theories. 13 Similarly, federal courts sitting in diversity prior to
8. The principal exception was federal criminal law, most notably the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, which provides substantial criminal penalties for theft of trade
secrets. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831-39 (2012)). Some trade secret owners have used other federal laws, like the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012), and section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012), as a vehicle for asserting civil claims in federal
court. None of these statutes, however, created a general private cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation under federal law. See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against
Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 334-38 (2015) (describing the limits of
these statutes for bringing civil trade secret claims).
9. See TANYA APLIN ET AL., GURRY ON BREACH OF CONFIDENCE: THE PROTECTION
OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION§ 3.03 (2d ed. 2012).
10. See RESTATEMENT(TH1RD) OFUNFAJRCOMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1995) ("The modem law of trade secrets evolved in England in the early 19th century,
apparently in response to the growing accumulation of technical know-how and the
increased mobility of employees during the industrial revolution."); see also Catherine L.
Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the
Rise ofCorporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 450-51 (2001)
(describing the decline of the master-apprentice relationship in a pre-industrial economy
as a method of confidentially transferring craft knowledge, and the associate rise of"a new
set of rules," including trade secrecy, in response to this development). Newbery v. James,
35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch. 1817), is commonly cited as the first reported trade secret case.
MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW§ 2:2 (2016).
11. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837).
12. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868).
13. See JAGER, supra note 10, § 2:2 (describing nineteenth and early-twentieth
century trade secret decisions); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 39 cmt. b (AM. LA w INST. 1995) ("Early trade secret cases, responding to requests for
injunctive relief against breaches of confidence, frequently supported the exercise of equity
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 14 applied common law principles to protect
against the unauthorized dissemination and use of trade secret
information. 15
The American Law Institute (ALI) undertook the first effort to
synthesize trade secret law in the United States, as reflected in the
Restatement (First) of Torts, published in 1939. 16 Although lacking the
force of codified law, this Restatement was highly influential, operating as
"the primary source for an understanding of the purpose and meaning of
trade secret law" for at least fifty years. 17 Section 757 of the Restatement
captured the common law principle that a party could be liable for
disclosing or using another's trade secret in breach of a duty of confidence
or following the discovery of the secret "by improper means." It also
recognized that third parties to the original misappropriation could be liable
if they learned the secret with notice of its secrecy and its
misappropriation. 18 In addition, the comments to § 757 set forth the types
of information eligible for protection 19 and the requirement that "the subject
jurisdiction by describing the plaintiff's interest in the trade secret as a property right ...
.").
14. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
15. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917)
(authorizing trial court to enter injunction to prevent against defendant's disclosure of
alleged trade secret information); Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104,
105-10 (7th Cir. 1936) (affirming entry of injunction prohibiting defendant from "making,
using, or selling a certain type of wrap for food products such as candy bars, and from
using, revealing, or making known the processes and machinery used in its manufacture").
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 757-58 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
17. See Sandeen, supra note 4, at 502; see also ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K.
SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW 27 (2d ed. 2017); Ramon A.
Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 282 (1980) (explaining
that the Restatement's "principles became primary authority by adoption in virtually every
reported case").
18. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939); see also Arthur L.
Goodhart, Restatement ofthe Law ofTorts, Volume IV: A Comparison Between American
and English Law, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488 (1943) ("Section 757 deals with liability for
disclosure or use of another's trade secret. It provides that a person is liable not only where
he breaks a contract of secrecy or induces another to break such a contract, but also where
he knows that the secret is being disclosed to him improperly or by mistake and he takes
advantage of it."). Section 758 of the Restatement further provided that an unwitting
recipient of trade secret information without knowledge of its status would not be liable for
misappropriation. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 758 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
19. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) ("A
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.").
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matter of a trade secret must be secret . . . so that, except by the use of
improper means, there would be difficulty in acqmnng the
information." 20 It also sanctioned a wide range of remedies for
misappropriation, including injunctive relief, damages for past harm, and
disgorgement of defendant's profits. 21 Significantly, however, the common
law of trade secrecy as expressed by the Restatement (First) of Torts did not
apply to trade secrets that were not in commercial use. 22
B.

THE ERIE/SEARS/COMPCO SQUEEZE

About the same time as the Restatement's publication, the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Erie effectively eliminated the possibility of
a non-statutory federal law of trade secrecy. 23 Erie famously declared that
"there is no federal general common law." 24 Rather, Erie and its progeny
generally require federal courts to apply the substantive law of the state
where the court sits (including choice oflaw rules), unless the Constitution,
a federal statute, or an applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governs
the issue. 25
Concerns about uniformity between state and federal courts motivated
the Erie Court to reject its previous rule in Swift v. Tyson, 26 which held that
federal courts sitting in diversity were not required to apply state common
law and could exercise "an independent judgment as to what the common
20. Id. This comment also listed six factors for determining whether the trade secret
holder took sufficient precautions to keep the information secret. See id. ("Some factors to
be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the
extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it
is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures
taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in
developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be
properly acquired or duplicated by others.").
21. Id. cmt. e.
22. Id. § 757 (protecting information "used in one's business" and giving "an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who did not know or use it").
23. See Sandeen, supra note 4, at 503 ("Because of Erie, the federal judiciary was out
of the business of developing the common law except in connection with the interpretation
and application of federal statutes.").
24. Erie, 304 U.S at 78.
25. See id. ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."); see also Federal Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965)
("[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity cases ... are to apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law.").
26. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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law . . . is-or should be." 27 As Justice Brandeis explained, Swift
"introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens against citizens" by
making "rights enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to
whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court." 28 Thus,
"[i]n attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States,
the [Swift] doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the
law." 29 Subsequent decisions have reiterated that a principal objective ofthe
Erie doctrine is to promote uniformity in the application of substantive law
to the extent feasible under our federalist system, 30 but uniformity as
between the state and federal courts of a state ("Erie uniformity"), rather
than uniformity among federal courts. 31
While Erie foreclosed a federal common law of trade secrecy, two other
Supreme Court decisions raised the question whether federal patent law
preempted state protection of trade secrets. In a pair of decisions Justice
Hugo Black wrote and issued on the same day in 1964, the Court in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stif.fel Co. 32 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lightning,
Inc. (collectively Sears/Compco) 33 held that the Patent Act preempted
Illinois's unfair competition law prohibiting product simulation. 34 In both
cases, the defendants copied and sold an unpatented lighting fixture
identical to those plaintiffs offered. 35 The trial court held both defendants
27. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
28. Id. at 74-75.
29. Id. at 75.
30. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Erie recognized that there
should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens,
for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating
uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs.").
31. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1574-79
(2008) (discussing the asserted importance of the uniform interpretation of federal law);
see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Myth of Uniformity in IP Law, 51 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
32. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
33. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
34. Product simulation is a claim of unfair competition based on "an unprivileged
imitation of the physical appearance of another's goods." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 741 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of
Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1527 (1959) (explaining that before
Sears/Compco, "[t]he originator of a design may, in the unusual case, be able to secure
protection against copying by resort to the state law of unfair competition").
35. In Sears, the plaintiff (Stiffel) had obtained design and utility patents covering its
product, but the district court held these patents "invalid for want of invention" (i.e.,
obviousness). Sears, 376 U.S. at 226. In Compco, the plaintiff(Day-Brite) obtained design
patent for its fixture, which the district court rejected as invalid. Compco, 376 U.S. at 235.
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liable for unfair competition, finding the similarity of their products to the
plaintiffs' products would likely confuse customers. 36 The U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously reversed in both cases, holding that Illinois law could
not impose liability for the copying of an unpatented good because it would
conflict with the Patent Act's policy of granting protection "only for true
inventions, and then only for a limited time." 37 Using expansive language,
and based upon concerns about federal uniformity, the Court suggested that
any state laws granting protection for inventions that failed to satisfy the
Patent Act's rigorous requirements would inevitably clash with federal law
and thus would be invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 38
The reasoning of Sears/Compco gave rise to speculation that a conflict
between state law and federal patent policy might be found whenever state
law sought to restrict the use of unpatented ideas, including those held as
trade secrets. 39 Indeed, the combined effect of Erie and Sears/Compco
which Professor Sandeen previously labeled the Erie/Sears/Compco
squeeze40--created a vacuum in federal law as Erie swept aside the federal
law of unfair competition that had developed before 1938, while
Sears/Compco limited the ability of states to adopt their own principles of
unfair competition. This led the New York City Bar Association and other
attorneys and organizations to call for federal legislation to address the
uncertainty regarding state unfair competition law, of which trade secrecy
is a part. 41 Beginning even before the Court's decisions in Sears/Compco,
36. Sears, 376 U.S. at 226; Compco, 376 U.S. at 235.
37. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232-33.
38. See id. at 230-32 (stating that under the federal patent laws, "the prerequisites to
obtaining a patent are strictly observed" and "uniform federal standards are carefully used
to promote innovation," and "allow[ing] a State by use of its law of unfair competition to
prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented
would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which federal law has
said belongs to the public").
39. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-emption-The
Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PATENT OFF. Soc'y 713, 731 (1967); Gordon L.
Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust
Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432 (1967); James M. Treece, Patent Policy and
Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1964); Note, Patent
Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting Judicial Standards of
Patentability, 87 HARV. L. REV. 807 (1974); Comment, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law
ofTrade Secrets, 62 NW. U. L. REV. 956 (1968); Note, Trade Secrets Law After Sears and
Compco, 53 VA. L. REV. 356 (1967).
40. Sandeen, supra note 4, at 507.
41. Id. at 504-05; see also John R. Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and
Compco: A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 69 DICK. L. REV. 347, 348-49
(1965) (asserting that the "controversy and confusion as to the meaning of the Court's
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New York Congressman John V. Lindsay repeatedly introduced legislation
to create a federal statute for unfair competition, including trade secrecy in
some versions, which would supplement the Lanham Act. 42 Ultimately, this
issue was resolved with the Court's decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp. 43 and the subsequent adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA).
C.

KEWANEE AND THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT

The Kewanee case brought patent law's potential preemption of state
trade secret law to the forefront. 44 Although it was not the first federal court
to find at least some aspects of state law regarding confidential information
preempted by the Patent Act, 45 the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Kewanee46
teed the issue up for the Supreme Court to review. 47 In an opinion that
carefully considered different types of inventions and whether they might
be eligible for patent protection, the Court held that although the
Constitution granted Congress the power to legislate in the area of
intellectual property48 this did not prohibit states from also adopting laws
and policies designed to promote innovation. 49 Rather, "the only limitation
on the states is that in regulating the areas of patents and copyrights they do
not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by

decisions" in Sears and Compco "illustrate the necessity for clarifying legislation," and
contending that unfair competition law "should be written into federal legislation"); Note,
Misrepresentation and the Lindsay Bill: A Stab at Uniformity in the Law of Unfair
Competition, 70 YALE L.J. 406 (1961) (discussing the initial Lindsay Bill).
42. See H.R. 7833, 86th Cong. (1959); H.R. 10038, 87th Cong. (1962); H.R. 4651,
88th Cong. ( 1963); see also Sandeen, supra note 4, at 505-06 (discussing the Lindsay Bill).
43. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
44. For a detailed history of the lead-up to and aftermath of Kewanee, see Sharon K.
Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles ofIntellectual Property Law to
Determine the Issue ofFederal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299 (2008).
45. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (refusing to
enforce the trade secret provision of a manufacturing agreement, finding a conflict with
patent policy), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
46. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1087 (6th Cir. 1973)
("[T]he field of protection afforded to this plaintiff by that Trade Secret Law has been
preempted by the Patent Laws of the United States."), rev'd, 416 U.S. 470 (1975).
47. See, e.g., Dekar Indus. v. Bissett-Bem1an Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970);
Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. ofAm.
v. Gen. Elec. Co. 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 478-79; cf Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560
(1973) (holding that U.S. copyright law did not preempt a state law protecting pre-1972
sound recordings).
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Congress."so The Court first concluded there was clearly no preemption for
trade secret information that was not patentables 1-for example, trade
secrets that fell outside the scope ofpatentable subject matter,s 2 or that were
merely obvious or trivial improvements over the existing state-of-the-art.s 3
For this category of information, "the holder ... would have no reason to
apply for a patent whether trade secret protection existed or not," and
"[a]bolition of trade secret protection would, therefore, not result in
increased disclosure to the public."s4 The more difficult question, the Court
conceded, involved trade secrets that were potentially patentable. For this
category of information, the majority concluded that there was no
preemption because trade secret law ultimately "provides far weaker
protection in many respects than patent law"-for instance, it does not
prohibit independent discovery or reverse engineering of the secret, and
protection can be lost ifthe secret is disclosed or becomes widely known.ss
As a result, the Court concluded there was no conflict between U.S. patent
law and Ohio's trade secret law because inventors of patent-eligible
inventions would generally opt for patent protection (and disclosure) rather
than secrecy. s6
After the Court's decision in Kewanee, the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL, now known as the Uniform Law Commission) resumed a
previously stalled effort to create a model statute that would help harmonize
state trade secret law.s 7 This culminated in the UTSA, promulgated in 1979
and amended in 1985.ss Among other goals, the UTSA' s drafters sought to
create "unitary definitions of trade secret and trade secret
misappropriation,"s 9 as well as to codify basic principles that had been
developed through case law, 60 thereby representing "the first major attempt
to legislate trade secret misappropriation[,] rather than to leave it in the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
Federal

Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 483-84.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Id. § 103.
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 483.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490-91.
See Sandeen, supra note 4, at 512-15, 517-20.
UTSA, Prefatory Note.
Id.
Klitzke, supra note 17, at 284; see also Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a
Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 432-33 (1995).
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hands of the courts." 61 The UTSA has been enormously influential in
modem trade secret law, having been adopted by forty-seven states since
its promulgation. 62
D.

ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (EEA) OF

1996

Congress's first meaningful foray into the realm of trade secrecy
occurred with the enactment of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of
1996. 63 Prior to the EEA, there was no federal civil or criminal law directed
specifically at trade secret misappropriation by private actors. 64 But in the
wake of claims of widespread espionage by foreign actors against domestic
industry (a theme later revisited with the DTSA), Congress provided for
criminal penalties for two forms of trade secret theft: (1) espionage on
behalf of a foreign entity65 and (2) theft of trade secrets for pecuniary gain. 66
These provisions define "misappropriation" essentially identically,
imposing liability on any individual or entity that:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a
trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws,
photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or
conveys a trade secret; [or]

61. Pace, supra note 60, at 433.
62. Trade Secrets Act: Enactment Status Map, UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Dec.
22, 2017). New York and Massachusetts are two states that still rely upon common law,
not having adopted the UTSA or their own trade secret statute. See Seaman, supra note 8,
at 353. North Carolina has adopted a statutory scheme of trade secret protection, but it
differs so substantially from the UTSA that the Uniform Law Commission has declined to
classify it as a UTSAjurisdiction. See id. at 329, 353 n.247.
63. Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831-32 (2016)).
64. See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 10 (1996) ("[N]o Federal law protects proprietary
economic information from theft and misappropriation in a systematic, principled manner.
As a result, prosecutors have had trouble shoe-homing economic espionage into these
laws."); Ben Shiffman et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 49 AM. CRJM. L. REV. 929, 932
(2012) ("[N]o federal criminal statute dealt directly with the theft of commercial trade
secrets until ... 1996."). While an older federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012), makes it
a misdemeanor offense for federal officials and employees to publicly disclose trade secret
information learned during their official duties, this law does not apply to private actors.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 183l(a) (Supp. IV 2016).
66. Id. § l 832(a).
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(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same
to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted
without authorization[. ]6 7

The EEA also prohibits attempts and conspiracies to commit
misappropriation68 and applies to extraterritorial conduct by U.S. citizens
or entities, as well as noncitizens, if "an act in furtherance of the offense
was committed in the United States." 69
Despite increasing enforcement in recent years, the EEA has not been
widely utilized by federal prosecutors. According to a 2012 study, the
federal government had filed 124 total criminal cases under the EEA, an
average of less than eight indictments per year. 70 The paucity of
enforcement actions caused commentators to call the EEA a
"disappointment"71 and conclude that it is "not acting as a deterrent against
theft of trade secrets." 72 It also provided a justification for the DTSA's
enactment.
E.

DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016

During consideration of the EEA, members of Congress contemplated
adding a civil cause of action to the bill, but ultimately declined to do so. 73
As a result, trade secret holders continued to bring misappropriation claims
under state law, and the volume of trade secret litigation significantly

67. Id.§ 183l(a)(l}-(3); id.§ 1832(a)(l}-(3) (containing the same definition with the
exception of replacing each instance of "a trade secret" with the phrase "such
information").
68. Id.§§ 183l(a)(4)--{5); id.§ 1832(a)(4}-(5).
69. Id. § 1837.
70. Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions: What
Companies Can Learn from It and What the Government Should Be Doing About It!, 84
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRJGHT J. 884, 885 (2012); see also Criminal Law-Economic
Espionage-Ninth Circuit Upholds First Trial Conviction Under§ 1831 ofthe Economic
Espionage Act of 1996-United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2011), 125 HARV.
L. REV. 2177, 2177 (2012) [hereinafter EEA Note] ("[S]urprisingly few cases have been
prosecuted under the [EEA].") (footnote omitted).
71. Chris Carr et al., The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX.
lNTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 199 (2000).
72. Toren, supra note 70, at 886; see also EEA Note, supra note 70, at 2181
("[F]ederal prosecutors have taken a markedly tentative approach toward prosecuting
§ 1831 offenses.").
73. See 142 CONG. REC. 27111-12 (1996) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)
(explaining that "[a]doption of [the EEA] will not be a panacea, but it is a start," and
recognizing that "available civil remedies may not be adequate to the task" of protecting
trade secrets and "that a Federal civil cause of action is needed").
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increased in the 1990s and 2000s. 74 In the wake of several high-profile
incidents of economic espionage, 75 as well as reports of widespread trade
secret theft by foreign entities allegedly costing American businesses
billions of dollars in losses, 76 members of Congress revisited the idea of a
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. This Section details
the history of the DTSA, including the arguments in favor of the bill, the
arguments of its opponents, and changes to the legislation as it made its way
through Congress. 77

74. See David S. Ahneling et. al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in
Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 302 tbl.l (2009) (showing that trade secret
decisions in federal court went from averaging less than five per year before the late 1980s
to over fifteen decisions per year by the 2000s); cf David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical
Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57 (2011) (showing
a more modest increase in trade secrets decisions in state court over this time).
75. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S.
Charges ofCyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/
20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.htrnl (reporting criminal charges
under the EEA against members of People's Liberation Army Unit 61398, which allegedly
invaded the computer networks of several major American corporations, including
Westinghouse, Alcoa and U.S. Steel, for the purpose of stealing trade secret information);
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 564 Fed. App'x 710 (4th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam); Bill Donahue, Kolon Pleads Guilty to DuPont Trade Secrets Theft, LAW360
(Apr. 30, 2015, 5:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/650192/kolon-pleads-guilty
to-dupont-trade-secrets-theft (explaining that the jury awarded DuPont over $900 million
for Kolon's alleged theft of trade secrets related to Kevlar bulletproof vests); Dan Levine,
U.S. Charges Chinese Man with Hacking into Boeing, REUTERS (July 11, 2014, 6:20 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/boeing-china-cybercrime/u-s-charges-chinese-man-wi th
hacking-into-boeing-id USL2N OPM2FV20 l 407 l l (documenting Chinese national charged
with theft of information related to military aircraft produced by Boeing).
76. COMM'N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION
REPORT 1 (2013), http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_ Commission_Report_052213.pdf
("The scale of international theft of American intellectual property (IP) is unprecedented
hundreds of billions of dollars per year ...."); OFFICE OF THE NAT'L
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPrES STEALING US ECONOMIC SECRETS IN
CYBERSPACE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, 2009-2011 at 4 (2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did
=720057 ("Estimates from academic literature on the losses from economic espionage
range ... from $2 billion to $400 billion or more a year ...."); UNITED STATES INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE U.S. ECONOMY xiv (2011),
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (estimating that in 2009, U.S. firms
lost between $14.2 billion and $90.5 billion due to IP infringement in China).
77. In the interests of full disclosure, both authors publicly opposed the Defend Trade
Secrets Act. See infra notes 117, 158-172 and accompanying text. Despite this, we have
strived in this Article to present a fair account of both sides' arguments regarding the
legislation.
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I. Legislative History ofthe DTSA
The DTSA traces its origins to legislation first introduced in the 112th
Congress (2011-2012). In 2011, newly-elected Senator Chris Coons of
Delaware offered an amendment to a currency manipulation bill that would
have amended the EEA to create a civil cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation. 78 Senator Coons explained that his motivation was to
provide greater trade secret protection to American businesses like
DuPont-a major employer in Senator Coons' home state that had recently
accused a Korean firm of misappropriating trade secrets for DuPont's next
generation Kevlar synthetic fiber. 79 The amendment would have followed
the UTSA by authorizing both injunctive relief and monetary damages
caused by the misappropriation, 80 as well as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees for willful and malicious misappropriation up to the amount
of actual damages awarded. 81 In addition, it would have permitted courts to
order, on an ex parte basis, the seizure of "any property (including
computers) used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit
or facilitate" trade secret misappropriation or to preserve evidence of such
misappropriation. 82 And like the later-passed DTSA, the amendment would
not have preempted existing state trade secret law. 83
The following year, Senators Coons, Herb Kohl of Wisconsin, and
Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island introduced a standalone bill, the
Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, which was
similar in numerous respects to Senator Coons' failed amendment. 84 Several
of the differences are noteworthy, however, because they were eventually

78. S. Amend. 729, Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of2011, S. 1619,
112th Cong. (2011), reprinted in 157 CONG. REC. S6229-30 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011).
Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin also sponsored this amendment.
79. 157 CONG. REC. S6175 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011) (statement of Sen. Coons). A jury
awarded DuPont $919 million for the defendant's willful misappropriation. Verdict, E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-58, 2011 WL 4445717,
(E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2011).
80. S. Amend. 729, Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of201 l, S. 1619,
l 12th Cong. (2011), reprinted in 157 CONG. REC. S6229-S6230 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836(a)(2), 1836(b)(4)(A)-(B)) (authorizing injunctive
relief, damages for actual loss due to the misappropriation, and disgorgement of any unjust
enrichment due to the misappropriation to the extent not considered in calculating actual
damages).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. S. 3389, I 12th Cong. (2012).
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incorporated into the DTSA. First, the bill modified the previously
proposed ex parte seizure provision by authorizing a party injured by a
seizure order to bring a civil action against the plaintiff for damages,
attorney's fees, and punitive damages if the seizure was sought in bad
faith. 85 Second, it would have expressly incorporated the UTSA's definition
of "misappropriation" 86 and defined "improper means" consistent with the
UTSA's commentary by making clear that no liability would attach for
reverse engineering or independent development of a trade secret. 87
However, it would have maintained the EEA's definition of a trade secret,
which was arguably broader than the UTSA's definition in some respects. 88
Finally, the bill included a jurisdictional requirement, requiring
"misappropriation of a trade secret that is related to or included in a product
for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce." 89 This bill expired without
a hearing or committee vote.
In the 113th Congress (2013-2014), more headway was made toward
enacting federal trade secret legislation, although again falling short.
Subcommittees of both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees held
hearings on the issue of trade secret theft and possible solutions where
numerous witnesses advocated for a federal civil remedy. 90 Thereafter,
85. Id. § 2(a).
86. Compare id. § 2(b), with UTSA § 1(2).
87. Compare S. 3389, l 12th Cong.§ 2(b) (2012) ("[T]he term 'improper means' ...
does not include reverse engineering or independent derivation."), with UTSA § 1 cmt
(explaining that "[p]roper means include" "[ d]iscovery by reverse engineering" and
"independent invention"). Trade secret litigator Russell Beck has argued that the EEA's
use of the term "independent derivation" rather than "independent invention" (as in the
UTSA) suggests that the former might be broader by permitting a misappropriator to
"cleanse his or her conduct by modifying a trade secret ... [and] then using only the
modified secret." Russell Beck, Defend Trade Secrets Act and What It Means, FAIR
COMPETITION L. (May 11, 2016), https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2016/05/11/defend
trade-secrets-act-and-what-it-means/. To the best of the authors' knowledge, however, no
court has adopted this distinction. Cf Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc.,
35 F.3d 1226, 1240 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Proof of derivation removes the possibility of
independent development ....").
88. See Seaman, supra note 8, at 361-62; see also Peter J. Toren, Five Things to Know
About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, IPWATCHDOG (May 11, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/1 l/five-things-know-defend-trade-secrets
act/id=68954/.
89. S. 3389, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2012).
90. See generally Economic Espionage and Trade Secret Theft: Are Our Laws
Adequate for Today's Threats?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l 13th Cong. (2014), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/economic-espionage-and-trade-secret-theft-are-our-laws-adequate-for-todays
threats; Trade Secrets: Promoting and Protecting American Innovation, Competitiveness
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several bills were introduced in both the House and Senate to amend the
EEA to create a private cause of action. 91 The most notable of these
proposals were the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, sponsored by
Senators Coons and Orrin Hatch ofUtah, 92 and the Trade Secrets Protection
Act of2014, which was introduced by a bipartisan group of members of the
House Judiciary Committee. 93 The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014 was
patterned after Senator Coons' prior proposals with a few modifications,
such as: modifying the ex parte seizure provision to more closely follow a
similar provision in the federal Lanham Act governing seizures of goods
bearing counterfeit marks; 94 increasing the ceiling on the amount of
exemplary damages; 95 and extending the statute oflimitations period to five
years. 96 The Trade Secrets Protection Act was similar to prior proposals as
well, except that it provided some additional limitations to protect against
potential abuse of the ex parte seizure remedy, such as requiring the
applicant to demonstrate both immediate and irreparable harm if the seizure
was not ordered. 97 Both bills failed to be adopted into law, although the
Trade Secrets Protection Act was favorably reported out of committee in
late 2014. 98
The effort to create a federal civil remedy for trade secret
misappropriation finally succeeded in the 114th Congress. In July 2015,
many of the same lawmakers who sponsored previous proposals introduced
identical bills in the House and Senate called the Defend Trade Secrets Act

and Market Access in Foreign Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, l 13th Cong. 7-67
(2014), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/113-97-88436.pdf.
91. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, l 13th Cong. (2014); Trade
Secrets Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5233, l 13th Cong. (2014); Private Right of Action
Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, l 13th Cong. (2013); Future of
American Innovation and Research Act of 2013, S. 1770, l 13th Cong. (2013); see also
Seaman, supra note 8, at 340-48 (describing these bills in greater detail).
92. S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014).
93. H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014). The bill's initial sponsors were Representatives
Steve Chabot (R-OH), Howard Coble (R-NC), John Conyers (D-MI), Suzan DelBene (D
W A), George Holding (R-NC), Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY), Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), and
Cedric Richmond (D-LA).
94. S. 2267, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014).
95. See id. (authorizing a court to award exemplary damages of up to three times the
amount of compensatory damages).
96. Id. § 2(a).
97. H.R. 5233, 113th Cong.§ 2(a) (2014).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 113-156 (2014).
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of 2015. 99 The new legislation largely tracked the proposals introduced in
the previous Congress. Among other things, the bills would modify the EEA
to:

•

permit the "owner of a trade secret" to "bring a civil action" if
"the person is aggrieved by the misappropriation of a trade
secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended
for use in, interstate or foreign commerce"; 100

•

grant federal district courts or\?iinal but not exclusive
jurisdiction over such civil claims; 1 1

•

adopt the UTSA's definition of"misappropriation" and codify
the UTSA's commentary that reverse engineering and
independent invention were not "improper means"; 102

•

authorize the "seizure of property necessary to prevent the
propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the
subject of the action" upon an ex parte application, subject to
numerous requirements; 103

•

create a cause of action for a person damaged by a "wrongful
or excessive seizure" order, and authorizing monetary
damages, attorney's fees, and punitive damages in cases of bad
faith·ro 4

•

authorize a court to award injunctive relief "to prevent any
actual or threatened misappropriation on such terms as the
court deems reasonable, provided the order does not prevent a
person from accepting an offer of employment under
conditions
that
avoid
actual
or
threatened
misappropriation;" 105

'

99. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, S. 1890, l 14th Cong. (2015); Defend Trade
Secrets Act of2015, H.R. 3326, I 14th Cong. (2015). For convenience, the footnotes below
cite only to the Senate's version of the DTSA as introduced.
100. H.R. 3326, I 14th Cong. § 2(a) (2015). Note that the words "or service" were
added in the wake of United States v. Aleynikov, 636 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012). See Theft of
Trade Secrets Clarification Act of2012, S. 3642, 112th Cong. (2012) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1832 (2012)).
101. H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015).
102. Id.§ 2(b).
103. Id. § 2(a).
104. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(ll) (2012) (describing the remedies for
wrongful seizure under the Lanham Act, which were incorporated by reference into the
DTSA).
105. H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. § 2(b) (2015). The DTSA also would permit courts to
"requir[ e] affirmative actions to be taken to protect the trade secret." Id. § 2(b ).
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authorize a court to award monetary remedies similar to the
UTSA, including "damages for actual loss caused by the
misappropriation," "damages for unjust enrichment caused by
the misappropriation that is not addressed in computing
damages for actual loss," or as an alternative, "a reasonable
royalty for the misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or
use of the trade secret"· 1°0
'
authorize a court to award exemplary damages "in an amount
not more than [three] times the amount of the [compensatory]
damages awarded" if "the trade secret was willfully and
maliciously misappropriated;" 107

•

grant reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party if (1) "a
claim of . . . misappropriation is made in bad faith," (2) "a
motion to terminate an injunction is made or opposed in bad
faith," or (3) "the trade secret was willfully and maliciously
misappropriated;" 108

•

impose a five-year statute of limitations period for bringing
such claims, which would begin to run when the
misappropriation was actually discovered "or by the exercise
ofreasonable diligence should have been discovered"; 109 and

•

reaffirm that the EEA/DTSA would not "preempt or displace
any other remedies, whether civil or criminal. . . for the
misappropriation of a trade secret" under federal, state, or local
law. frtJ

The legislation also included an uncodified "Sense of Congress"
provision that, inter alia, stated that the EEA as amended should "appl[y]
broadly to protect trade secrets from theft." 111 In addition, it would impose
a new requirement on the Attorney General to make biannual reports to
Congress on the scope of trade secret theft occurring abroad and
recommendations about additional actions to reduce its impact on American
businesses. 112 Finally, it provided the EEA and DTSA "shall not be

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 2(d). The DTSA also provided that "a continuing misappropriation
constitutes a single claim of misappropriation." Id.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012); see also H.R. 3326, l 14th Cong.§ 2(f) (2015).
111. H.R. 3326, l 14th Cong.§ 4 (2015). Unlike other provisions of the DTSA, section
4 was not designated for codification in the United States Code.
112. Id. §3.
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construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any
other Act of Congress." 113
Action first proceeded in the Senate, where the Judiciary Committee
held the first and only hearing on the legislation in December 2015. 114 At
this hearing, witnesses from private industry and an experienced trade secret
litigator expressed support, while Professor Sandeen spoke in opposition,
presenting the law professors' position against the bill. 115 Witnesses in favor
emphasized the desirability of a uniform national standard for trade secrets
law, access to a federal forum for trade secret misappropriation claims, and
the need for an ex parte seizure remedy in extraordinary cases. 116 Professor
Sandeen argued that the DTSA would not directly address the problem of
cyberespionage (cited by many supporters as a reason for the bill) and raised
several concerns, including the potential abuse of DTSA litigation for
anticompetitive purposes, the likely increase in attorney's fees to adjudicate
trade secret claims in federal court, and how the federal courts might address
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 117 During the hearing, members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee were generally supportive of the DTSA, 118
although several senators expressed concern about the impact and potential
abuse ofthe ex parte seizure provision, 119 which had been criticized by some
academics and practitioners. 120

113. Id. § 2(g).
114. See generally Protecting Trade Secrets: The Impact of Trade Secret Theft on
American Competitiveness and Potential Solutions to Remedy This Harm: Hearing on S.
1890 and HR. 3326 Before the Full S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015),
(statement of Sharon Sandeen, Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law),
https ://www .judiciary.senate. govlimo/media/doc/ 12-02-15 %20Sandeen%20Testimony
.pdf.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 5 (statement of Thomas R. Beall, Vice President and Chief Intellectual
Property Counsel, Coming Inc.), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-02
15%20Beall%20Testimony.pdf; id. at 4-5 (statement ofKaren Cochran, Associate General
Counsel and Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/l 2-02- l 5%20Cochran%20Testimony
.pdf; id. at 7-8 (statement of James Pooley, Principal, James Pooley, PLC), http://www.
judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-02-15%20Pooley%20Testimony.pdf.
117. Id. at 1-7 (statement of Professor Sharon K. Sandeen).
118. See generally id. (statements of Sen. Hatch, Sen. Coons, Sen. Grassley),
https ://www .judiciary. senate. gov/meetings/protecting-trade-secrets-the-impact-of-trade
secret-theft-on-american-competitiveness-and-potential-sol utions-to-remedy-this-harm.
119. See generally id. (questions of Sen. Whitehouse and Sen. Klobuchar).
120. See generally Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2015).
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The following month, Senators Hatch and Coons offered a manager's
amendment that made numerous changes to the DTSA, including
addressing some provisions that the law professors found objectionable. 121
Specifically, the amendment provided that only the "owner" (as defined) of
a trade secret could bring a civil claim, 122 reduced the statute of limitations
period from five years to three years to follow the majority rule under state
law, 123 and amended the definition of "trade secret" and "improper means"
to be more consistent with the UTSA. 124 The amendment also lowered the
amount of potential exemplary damages to twice (rather than triple) the
amount of compensatory damages. 125 In addition, it added language
providing that an ex parte seizure could be ordered only in "extraordinary
circumstances" 126 and included further limitations on the scope and
enforcement of such seizures. 127
Another significant modification in the manager's amendment limited
the scope of injunctive relief for departing employees. First, the bill was
amended so that any injunction must "be based on evidence of threatened

121. S. 1890, l 14th Cong.§ 2(a) (2015) (as amended on Jan. 8, 2016).
122. Id.§ 2(a)(l) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(l) (Supp. IV 2016)).
123. Id. § 2(d) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § l 836(d) (Supp. IV 2016)); see also
Seaman, supra note 8, at appendix B (showing that the majority of states have a three-year
statute oflimitations period).
124. Specifically, the amendment changed the EEA's existing definition of "trade
secret" by striking the words "the public" from the requirement that a trade secret is "not .
. . generally known to, and not readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public"
and inserting "another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use
of the information." S. 1890, l 14th Cong.§ 2(b) (2015) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1839(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2016)). It also clarified that in addition to "reverse engineering"
and "independent derivation," "improper means" also does not include "any other lawful
means of acquisition" ofa trade secret. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (Supp. IV
2016)).
125. Id.§ 2(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(C) (Supp. IV 2016)).
126. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2016)).
127. For instance, the revised ex parte seizure provision required that "the person
against whom seizure" would be ordered must have actual possession of both the trade
secret and the property to be seized, id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V)
(Supp. IV 2016)), it "prohibit[ed]" (rather than merely "restrict[ed]") access to the trade
secret by the party requesting the seizure, id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I)
(Supp. IV 2016)), and it required the district court to "provide guidance to law enforcement
officials" regarding how they are to execute the seizure order, id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1836(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 2016)). It also authorizes the court to appoint a special
master "to locate and isolate all misappropriated trade secret information and to facilitate
the return of unrelated property and data to the person from whom the property was seized."
Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(iv) (Supp. IV 2016)).
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misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows." 128
Second, the bill included new language regarding the inevitable disclosure
doctrine and restraints of trade by providing that an injunction cannot
"conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice
of a lawful profession, trade, or business." 129 In effect, these revisions
incorporated state law governing restrictive covenants (such as noncompete
agreements) by reference, ensuring that such law will apply in federal court,
although they did not directly address potential choice of law issues. 130
Finally, the manager's amendment made several other discrete
modifications to the DTSA. It added trade secret misappropriation as a
predicate offense for criminal liability under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 131 and it increased the penalties for
violating the criminal theft of trade secrets under the EEA to the greater of
$5 million or three times the value of the stolen trade secrets. 132 It also
required the Federal Judicial Center to develop recommended best practices
for seizing, storing, and securing trade secret information. 133
In addition, Senators Charles Grassley (Iowa) and Patrick Leahy
(Vermont) offered a new amendment intended to "provide protection to
whistleblowers who disclose trade secrets to law enforcement in confidence
for the purpose ofreporting or investigating a suspected violation oflaw." 134
This proposal, based on an article by Professor Peter Menell of the
University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 135 would immunize an
individual from civil and criminal liability for the confidential disclosure of
trade secret information to a "[f]ederal, state, or local governmental official,
either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney" if the disclosure was made
"solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of

128. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 2016)).
129. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. IV 2016)).
130. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Senate Judiciary Committee Passes Amended Defend
Trade Secrets Act. What Changed?, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/01 /senate-judiciary-committee-passes
amended-defend-trade-secrets-act-what-changed-guest-b log-post. bun.
131. S. 1890, 114th Cong.§ 3(b) (2015) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(Supp. IV 2016)).
132. Id.§ 3(a)(l) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1832(b) (Supp. IV 2016)).
133. Id. § 6.
134. S. REP. No. 114-220, at 5 (2016).
135. Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection,
105 CALIF. L. REV. l, 61 (2017).
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law." 136 In addition, it would permit the disclosure of a trade secret "in a
complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such
filing was made under seal." 137 Notably, this provision-unlike the rest of
the DTSA-would preempt any contrary federal or state law that would
otherwise impose liability for the disclosure. 138 The Senate Judiciary
Committee unanimously adopted this Amendment at what is known as an
Executive Business Meeting, but the whistleblower provision was never
subject to a public hearing where testimony was allowed. 139
Several months later, in April 2016, the full Senate unanimously voted
to pass the DTSA as modified by the manager's amendment. 140 The House
then acted quickly, favorably reporting the Senate's version of the DTSA
out of committee later the same month without further changes, 141 and then
overwhelmingly approving the bill on the floor under suspension of the
rules (a procedure typically used for non-controversial legislation). 142
President Obama signed the DTSA into law on May 11, 2016. 143 Pursuant
to its terms, the DTSA applies to all acts of trade secret misappropriation
occurring on or after this date. 144
2. Supporters and Their Arguments
The DTSA' s sponsors offered several reasons in support of a federal
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. First, as with the EEA
before it, they argued that it was needed to address the growing problem of
trade secret theft against American businesses, particularly in light of
technological developments since the EEA (like widespread use of the
internet) that made it easier to engage in and conceal misappropriation of

136. S. 1890, 114th Cong.§ 7(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2015) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1833(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 2016)).
137. Id. § 7(b)(l)(B) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(l)(B) (Supp. IV
2016)).
138. Id. § 7(b)(l)(A) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(l)(A) (Supp. IV
2016)).
139. S. REP. No. 114-220, at 5 (2016).
140. 150 CONG. REC. D321 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016). The floor vote in the Senate was
87-0.
141. 152 CONG. REC. D400, D408 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2016); see also H.R. REP. No.
114-529 (2016).
142. 162 CONG. REC. H2028, D438 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016). The floor vote in the
House was 410-2.
143. 162 CONG. REC. S2675, D501 (daily ed. May 11, 2016).
144. S. 1890, l 14th Cong.§ 2(e) (2015).
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trade secret information. 145 Some also alluded to organized efforts by
foreign actors and governments to engage in misappropriation as a reason
for Congress to act. 146 Second, sponsors contended that existing state laws
varied significantly in their treatment of trade secrets and that the DTSA
would help "harmonize U.S. law" by creating a "single national baseline"
for trade secret protection. 147 Third, they asserted that the DTSA would
benefit trade secret owners by providing access to federal court in a manner
similar to other forms of intellectual property, such as patents and
copyrights. 148 Finally, supporters pointed to the bill's ex parte seizure
provision, which they asserted would allow trade secret owners to quickly
obtain a federal court order authorizing the seizure of property to prevent
further dissemination of the trade secrets and preserve evidence of
misappropriation. 149
145. See S. REP. No. 114-220, at 1-2 (2016) (listing several studies suggesting that
"annual losses to the American economy caused by trade secret theft" ranged in the
hundreds of billions of dollars and asserting that "[p]rotecting trade secrets has become
increasingly difficult given ever-evolving technological advancements"); H.R. REP. No.
114-529, at 3-4 (2016) (citing similar studies). Note, however, that these figures, when
traced to the underlying studies, concern the estimated value of all intellectual property
theft, not just the theft of trade secrets. Moreover, as Zoe Argento has explained, there is
scant factual evidence to back up these numbers. See Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden
Goose: The Dangers ofStrengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber
Misappropriation, 16 YALEL.J. 172, 197-99 (2014).
146. See H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 4 (2016) (noting the "'significant and growing
threat presented by criminals who engage in espionage on behalf of foreign adversaries and
competitors'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 112-610, at 1(2012)));161 CONG. REC. S7251 (daily
ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[C]yber theft of trade secrets is at an all-time
high, particularly as it involves Chinese competitors ....").
147. 162 CONG. REC. Sl630 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016); see also id. at Sl627 (Sen. Hatch)
("[H]aving a uniform set of standards that defines legal protections for trade secrets is
crucial .... State laws today are perhaps even more variable in their treatment of trade
secrets than they were at the time the [UTSA] was proposed in 1979."); H.R. REP. No. 113
657, at 7 (2014) ("While 48 states have adopted variations of the UTSA, the state laws vary
in a number of ways ...."); S. REP. No. 114-220, at 14 (2016) ("This narrowly drawn
legislation will provide a single, national standard for trade secret misappropriation ....").
148. S. REP. No. 114-220, at 3 (2016) ("A Federal cause of action will allow trade
secret owners to protect their innovations by seeking redress in Federal court, bringing their
rights into alignment with those long enjoyed by owners of other forms of intellectual
property ...."); id. at 14-15 ("Victims [of trade secret theft] will be able to move quickly
to federal court, with certainty of the rules, standards, and practices to stop trade secrets
from winding up being disseminated and losing their value."); see also 161 CONG. REC.
S725 l (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2015) (Sen. Coons) (explaining the DTSA "gives trade secret
owners access to . . . our excellent Federal courts, which provide nationwide service of
process and execution ofjudgments").
149. See H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 3 (2016).
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Numerous large industrial, high-technology, and pharmaceutical and
medical device firms promoted enactment of the DTSA, including Boeing,
Caterpillar, Coming, Eli Lilly, General Electric, IBM, Intel, Johnson &
Johnson, Nike, Pfizer, Procter & Gamble, and 3M, as well as industry and
business associations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Biotechnology Association, and the
Software & Information Industry Associations. 150 Many of these same
organizations also engaged in extensive lobbying efforts under the moniker
"Protect Trade Secrets Coalition," retained the prominent law firm of
Covington & Burling LLP, and expended at least $1.25 million in support
of the DTSA. 151 Numerous other U.S.-based firms, including DuPont, 152
Microsoft, 153 Monsanto, 154 and Yahoo!, 155 also engaged in lobbying for the
DTSA. The DTSA also received support from the intellectual property bar,

150. Letter from Ass'n of Glob. Automakers, Inc., et al., to Senator Orrin Hatch et al.
(July 29, 2015), https://www.congress.gov/crec/2015/10/08/CREC-2015-10-08-ptl
PgS7249.pdf; see also Letter from Adobe et al., to Senator Charles E. Grassley et al. (Jan.
20, 2016), http://www.nam.org/Issues/Technology/Intellectual-Property-Rights/Joint
Industry-Coalition-Letter-in-S upport-of-Defend-Trade-Secrets-Act-to-Senate. pdf (listing
forty-four firms and associations supporting the DTSA).
151. Protect Trade Secrets Coalition, CTR. FOR RESPONSlVE POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=Fl 19265&year=2017 (last visited
Dec. 22, 2017) (disclosing that the Protect Trade Secrets Coalition spent $500,000 in 2014,
$520,000 in 2015, and $250,000 in 2016); Isaac Amsdorf, How a Bill (with Virtually No
Opposition Still Takes Two Years Before It Almost) Becomes a Law (in 2016), POLITICO
(May 9, 2016) (listing nearly thirty lobbyists who worked in favor of the DTSA's passage).
152. DuPont Co, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientissues_spec.php?id=D000000495&year=2016&spec=CPT (last visited Dec. 22,
2017) (listing "Intellectual Property Protection and Enforcement - H.R. 3326 and S. 1890
- The Defend Trade Secrets Act" as a lobbying issue).
153. Microsoft Corp, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/clientissues_ spec.php?id=DOOOOOO115&year=2016&spec=CPT (last visited Dec.
22, 2017) (listing "S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015" as a lobbying issue).
154. Monsanto Co, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/clientissues_spec.php?id=D000000055&year=2016&spec=CPT (last visited Dec.
22, 2017) (listing "Issues relating to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (H.R. 3326, S.
1890)" as a lobbying issue).
155. Yahoo! Inc, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
clientissues_ spec.php?id=D000022330&year=2016&spec=CPT (last visited Dec. 22,
2017) (listing "S.1890, Defend Trade Secrets Act" as a lobbying issue).
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including the Intellectual Property Law Section of the American Bar
Association 156 and the American Intellectual Property Law Association. 157

3. Opponents and Their Arguments
The primary opposition to the DTSA came from a group of law
professors. These professors (including the authors of this Article)
uniformly acknowledged the need to protect legitimate trade secrets but
expressed concerns regarding several aspects of the DTSA, 158 as well as
reservations about the broader notion that a federal civil cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation was necessary or desirable. 159
In an August 2014 letter responding to then-pending legislation, thirty
one law professors "urge[ d] Congress to reject the proposed legislation to
create a new private cause of action under the Economic Espionage Act of
1996." 160 While "acknowledg[ing] the need to increase protection ...
against domestic and foreign cyber-espionage," the letter contended that the
proposed legislation "is not the way to address those concerns" because it
would "create or exacerbate many existing legal problems." 161 First, the
professors argued that existing state law governing trade secrets is "robust"
and "substantially uniform," and that adopting a parallel federal statute for
trade secret claims-particularly one that did not preempt existing state
law-would result in "less uniformity and predictability" because a new
federal law would not necessarily follow existing state law precedent. 162
Notably, this is the very concern that animated the Supreme Court's
decision in Erie. Second, the letter raised concerns that the proposed ex
parte seizure provision was "not necessary in light of the broad discretion
that federal courts already have under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"
and that this provision could be misused by trade secret holders to harm
156. See Letter from Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Section of Intellectual Prop. Law, Am.
Bar Ass'n, to Senator Charles E. Grassley et al. (Oct. 5, 2015), reprinted in 161 CONG.
REC. S7252-53 (Oct. 8, 2015).
157. See Letter from Denise W. Defranco, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass'n, to Senator Charles E. Grassley et al. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/
congress/114C/Documents/AIPLA %20Letter%20Supporting%20S 1890%20Trade%20Se
cret%2012.1.15.pdf.
158. See generally, David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade
Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230 (2015); Goldman, supra note 120.
159. See generally Seaman, supra note 8; Argento, supra note 145.
160. Letter from David S. Levine et al., Professors of Law, to Members of the United
States
Cong.
(Aug.
26,
2014),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2699735 [hereinafter Professors' 2014 Letter].
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at 2.
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legitimate competitors. 163 The professors also contended that the legislation
could increase the risk of accidental disclosure of trade secret information
because defendants would likely challenge the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction (specifically, the requirement that the trade secret is "related to
a product or service . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce"), and in
response, plaintiffs would be compelled to identify and disclose trade secret
information early in the litigation process. 164 Finally, the letter argued that
federal legislation may have a negative impact on innovation, as threats of
misappropriation claims against former employees who join a competitor
or start their own business might "limit mobility of labor and potential
innovation collaboration" by "reducing the diffusion of skills and
knowledge and stifling the innovation that flows from the sharing of ideas
and information." 165
In response to the DTSA's reintroduction the following year, a second
letter signed by forty-two law professors reiterated and expanded upon
these arguments. 166 First, the letter expressed continued concern that the
bill's ex parte seizure provision-although narrower than in previous
proposals-"still contains significant potential to cause anticompetitive
harm, particularly against U.S.-based small businesses, startups, and other
entrepreneurs." It also argued that the ex parte seizure provision was
"impermissibly vague" and "may result in significant harm to [an] alleged
misappropriator's legitimate business operations." 167 Second, it asserted
that the DTSA "appears to implicitly recognize the so-called inevitable
disclosure doctrine," which permits trade secret holders to obtain injunctive
relief against a former employee if the employee's new job "will inevitably
lead [him or her] to rely on the plaintiffs trade secrets." 168 Federal adoption
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the professors argued, could harm
innovation by decreasing labor mobility. 169 In addition, it would conflict
with existing law in some states, like California, that have rejected the

163. Id. at 3-5.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 6.
166. Letter from Eric Goldman et al., Professors of Law, Charles E. Grassley,
Chairperson, United States Senate Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 17, 2015), https://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%200pposition%20to%20D
TSA%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Professors' 2015 Letter].
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id. at 5.
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doctrine as a matter of long-standing public policy. 170 Third, the letter
contended that the DTSA would likely increase the length and cost of trade
secret litigation, including through the liberal discovery permitted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 171 Finally, it reasserted that, contrary to
the sponsors' assertions, the DTSA would result in less uniformity. 172 While
the law professors ultimately could not stop the DTSA' s enactment, their
advocacy resulted in numerous changes to the pending legislation.
III.

INTERPRETATIVE RULES AND METHODOLOGIES OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS

With the DTSA's enactment, we have a federal statute but little federal
jurisprudence to guide us as to the meaning of many of its provisions. 173
Since the DTSA is modeled after the UTSA, incorporating several of its
provisions verbatim, some appear to assume that the two will be interpreted
and applied consistently. 174 But the federal courts' approach to statutory
interpretation and post-Erie jurisprudence concerning the development and
scope of "federal common law" do not necessarily support such an
assumption. 175 Moreover, even if federal courts do tum to existing state
trade secret law to help interpret or fill gaps in the DTSA' s text, 176 they will
170. Id. (citing White v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291-94 (Ct. App.
2002)); see also Letter from Sharon K. Sandeen, Professor of Law, Hamline Univ. School
of Law, to Senator Dianne Feinstein (Aug. 24, 2014) (on file with authors) (explaining the
long-standing public policy of California).
171. Professors' 2015 Letter, supra note 166, at 5-6.
172. Id.at6-7.
173. Some federal jurisprudence exists with respect to the original Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), but given recent amendments to the EEA by the DTSA and
the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627,
there is still a lot of "old" and "new" language to construe.
174. See, e.g., ROBERT MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017, VOL. I:
PERSPECTfVES, TRADE SECRETS, AND PATENTS 43-44 (noting that 47 of 50 states have
adopted the UTSA, and stating that the Defend Trade Secrets Act "brought uniformity of
federal law without significantly changing the rules that have developed in state law").
175. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4514-20 (3d ed. 2016).
176. See id. § 4518 (explaining that federal courts apply the forum's state law when
either "a federal statute ... directs that forum state law is to be applied, or as a matter of
discretion in the exercise of their power to determine the content of federal common law");
cf Semtek Int'!, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504-09 (2001) (electing as
a matter of federal common law to adopt state substantive law regarding the preclusive
effect of a federal court's judgment in a diversity action because it would promote Erie
uniformity).
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also be faced with the potentially significant question of which state law to
apply, as the substance of state trade secret law may vary. 177 Thus, although
one of the asserted purposes for the DTSA was greater national uniformity
(as opposed to Erie uniformity), this may be unachievable if federal courts
follow forum state precedent, thus federalizing any existing conflicts
between states' law. 178
As further explained below, courts applying the DTSA will be
confronted with two separate but overlapping approaches. The first is the
familiar process of statutory interpretation based upon the statutory text,
congressional intent, legislative history, and other rules and canons of
statutory construction. But in cases where these sources fail to provide clear
answers-which we think will be common--courts may tum to other
sources oflaw to resolve ambiguities and fill gaps in the DTSA's language,
the latter process being known as "interstitial lawmaking" that results in the
creation of "specialized federal common law." 179 Thus, despite Erie's
famous proclamation that "there is no federal general common law," 180
federal courts since Erie have developed interstitial federal common law in
numerous areas, running the gamut from disputes involving comprehensive
and preemptive federal statutes to purely state-based causes of action that
affect a "uniquely federal interest." 181 Unfortunately, federal courts are not
always careful to delineate when they engage in statutory interpretation or
in gap-filling, leading a group of civil procedure experts to explain:
The demarcation between 'statutory interpretation' or
'constitutional interpretation,' on the one hand, and judge-made
law on the other, is not a sharp line. Statutory interpretation shades

177. See H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 4 (2016) ("While 48 states have adopted variations
of the UTSA, the state laws vary in a number of ways ....").
178. The opponents of the DTSA, including the authors of this Article and even some
of its supporters, asserted that claims of a lack of uniformity in state trade secret law were
grossly overstated because most states have adopted the UTSA with minimal, if any,
changes to its core provisions. See Professors' 2014 Letter, supra note 160, at 2;
Professors' 2015 Letter, supra note 166, at 6-8.
179. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514; see also Radha A. Pathak, Incorporate
State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 841 (2011) ("It should be acknowledged that
such gap-filling is conceived by some as the creation offederal coil1Illon law and by others
as statutory interpretation.").
180. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
181. See, e.g., Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) ("In
absence ofan applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing
rule of law according to their own standards."); see also Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray,
A Theory ofFederal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 585 (2006).
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into judicial lawmaking on a spectmm, as specific evidence of
legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenuates. 182

The rest of this Part explains the two processes at a macro-level and
discusses several cases and issues for illustrative purposes. Part IV then
examines specific provisions of the DTSA using these rules and
methodologies.
A.

RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

After reading numerous decisions by federal judges, one is struck by the
variety of approaches to statutory interpretation. This is due in part to the
different interpretive methodologies and sources that federal courts may use
to determine the meaning of a statute. 183 It also depends on how detailed the
federal law is and whether it provides meaning on the face of the statute
itself or requires gap--filling. From a reading ofrecent Supreme Court cases,
however, some general principles emerge that likely will be followed in
interpreting the DTSA. 184

1. Intent ofCongress as Expressed in the Language ofthe Statute
The process of statutory interpretation begins with the language of the
statute itself. 185 At this initial stage, courts avoid extrinsic sources of
information concerning congressional intent because Congress is presumed
to have intended what it said and "the objective of statutory interpretation
182. PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 (3d ed.
1988); see also Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death
ofDiversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 330-41 (1980).
183. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice ofNational and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797
(1957).
184. For a general description of this process and the applicable hierarchy, see LARRY
M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND RECENT TRENDS (2011 ), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589 .pdf. Although this report
provides an overview of statutory interpretation methods and does not comprehensively
address all scholarship on the topic of statutory interpretation, it is significant because it is
intended to serve as a guide for Members of Congress and their staff. See Abbe R. Gluck
& Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation.from the Inside-An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013)
(presenting the results of the largest empirical study to date of congressional staff statutory
drafting practices and knowledge of the rules of statutory interpretation).
185. See Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) ("[T]he starting point
in determining congressional intent is statutory language ...."); Cmty. for Creative Non
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) ("The starting point for our interpretation of a
statute is always its language.").
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is to give effect to the intent of Congress." 186 Where congressional intent is
clear, there is no role for the federal courts other than to apply the law as
written. 187
In a perfect world, a statute's language would be complete and
unambiguous, but because this is not always the case, other rules of
statutory interpretation have been developed to assist courts in determining
and applying Congress' intent. After reading the statute for guidance,
including applicable statutory definitions, courts typically consult: ( 1) a
dictionary, particularly if a term used in a statute is not defined by the
statute; (2) the entirety of the statute and the context of the language at issue;
(3) canons of statutory interpretation; and (4) legislative history, although
some disapprove of this practice. 188

2. Statutory Definitions
Unless words used in a statute have statutory definitions, they "will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." 189
Where statutory definitions are provided, they control even if they differ
from the common meaning. 190 An example of this exists in the DTSA where
the term "employee," as used in the whistleblower provision, is defined in
a way that is inconsistent with the common meaning of that term because it
includes a "contractor or consultant of the employer" as part of that
definition. 191
While the DTSA includes a definition section for terms like
"improper," "trade secret," and "misappropriation," 192 many of the words
and phrases used in those provisions are themselves undefined. This
includes the key concepts of "generally known," "readily ascertainable,"
186. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1390 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
187. ErG, supra note 184, at 5 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253-54 (1992)).
188. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW (1st ed. 2012),
with William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1999).
189. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); see also Will v. Mich. Dep'tofState
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
190. ElG, supra note 184, at 6.
191. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1833(2)(b)(4) (2012), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining an employee). Such definition is,
however, consistent with language in the False Claims Act, which gives "employees,
contractors, and agents" standing to seek relief from retaliatory actions relating to
whistleblowing activity. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(l) (2012).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
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"economic value," and "reasonable efforts" that are embedded in the
definition of a trade secret. Thus, even for those parts of the DTSA where
definitions exist, federal courts still may have to look elsewhere for
guidance in determining their meaning. Hopefully, they will look to the
"ordinary meaning" of those terms as they have developed under state trade
secret law, but courts may not, particularly where a clear and ordinary
meaning has yet to develop under state law. 193
Although definitions of similar words and phrases may exist in other
federal statutes, the preference for statutory definitions ordinarily does not
apply to definitions contained in other statutes. 194 Thus, federal courts will
interpret the same terms within a statute the same way, but not necessarily
consistent with the same language found elsewhere. 195 However, this is not
an ironclad rule. For example, a canon of construction known as "the
borrowed statute rule" 196 may result in definitions from other statutes
(federal or state) being applied if the subject provisions were clearly
"borrowed" from the other statute. Moreover, when filling gaps in a statute,
it is not unheard of for federal courts to rely upon definitions contained in
other statutes. 197 This illustrates how the process of statutory interpretation
is convoluted and why the process of filling gaps in a statute may rely on
different sources of information than is used in statutory interpretation.
When federal law directly incorporates definitions from other statutes
as is the case with many provisions of the DTSA, including the definition
of misappropriation and the remedies provision-the borrowed statute rule
directs courts to look to the statute from which the language was borrowed
for guidance as to its meaning. Further complicating the process, federal
courts may look to state law for a definition when a word is not defined by
a federal statute and a dictionary definition does not make sense given the
purpose and context of the federal statute. 198
193. For example, the definition of"economic value" under state law is both unsettled
and under-theorized. See Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLfNE L.
REV. 545 (2010).
194. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) ("When
conducting statutory interpretation, the Court 'must be careful not to apply rules applicable
under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination."' (quoting
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008))).
195. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990); see also United Sav. Ass'n of
Tex. v. Timbers oflnwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
196. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of the West v. United States, 243 F. 3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (looking to analogous statute to establish waiver of sovereign immunity).
198. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)
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How the incorporation of another statute into a federal statute is worded
determines whether the law to be consulted is that which existed as of the
time the subject federal statute was enacted or as it has continued to evolve
since that time. If a federal statute specifically incorporates language from
another statute, the meaning applied is that which existed on the date the
federal statute incorporating such language was enacted. 199 But where the
federal statute states, by general reference, that another law applies, then it
is presumed that Congress intended the ongoing borrowing of that law as it
evolves and changes. 200 However, in both situations, "[b ]ecause state law
applies as a matter of choice in the incorporated state-law context, the Erie
obligation to apply state law accurately does not apply." 201
Like statutory language generally, statutory definitions can themselves
be ambiguous and incomplete, thus requiring courts to rely upon extrinsic
sources of information to determine their meaning. These sources might
include dictionary definitions and statutory context, as well as
interpretations given to the terms by relevant administrative agencies. 202
Where the federal statutory definition is incorporated from state law, as is
the case with the definitions of "trade secret," "misappropriation,'' and
"improper means" in the DTSA, the extrinsic sources may be based on state
law.203

3. Dictionary Definitions
If a statutory definition is ambiguous, federal courts often look at a
dictionary of general distribution published around the same time as the

(applying the definition of "employee" and "scope of employment" set forth in the
Restatement of Agency for the work made for hire doctrine in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 201 (2012)).
199. See EIG, supra note 184, at 39 ("[l]ncorporations by 'general reference' normally
include subsequent amendments, but ... incorporations by 'specific reference' normally
do not.") (citing NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §51.07 (6th ed. 2000)).
200. Id.
201. Pathak, supra note 179, at 845; see also Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law,
83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 838 (1989) ("When the relevant sovereign is identified to be 'the
nation,' we know that any law for the issue, state or federal, will be fashioned on the basis
of, or constrained by limits reflecting, national policy concerns.").
202. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
203. See, e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 739 (applying the definition of"employee" and "scope
of employment" set forth in the Restatement of Agency for the work made for hire doctrine
in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201).
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statutory enactment. 204 Issues that arise in applying this rule include
deciding upon the proper dictionary and the multiple meanings of some
words. 205 And even when a word is defined in a dictionary, sometimes a
court will determine that, given the purpose of the legislation and the
placement of the word in context, the dictionary definition is not helpful. 206
This is particularly true with words and phrases that have become "words
of art" in a particular field or that have a specialized legal meaning. 207 For
instance, both the UTSA and the DTSA use the term "generally known,"
which might be interpreted to mean "generally known to the public."
However, under longstanding principles of trade secret law, it also means
generally known within a specific industry, even if the information is not
well-known among the general public. 208
4. The Importance ofContext
Sometimes, the words and phrases that are used in a statute have
multiple definitions or are not defined in a dictionary at all, thereby
requiring federal courts to resort to other canons of statutory interpretation.
One such canon states that ambiguous language should be considered in
light of the entirety of the statute, which can provide a better understanding
of Congress's intent than an isolated word. 209 As one court explained:
[R]easonable statutory interpretation must account for both "the
specific context in which ... language is used" and "the broader
context of the statute as a whole." A statutory "provision that may
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of
the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible

204. See St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1987). However, a
court will not consider "idiosyncratic" dictionary definitions. See MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225-30 (1994).
205. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 225-30.
206. See, e.g., Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 133 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (2013) (finding
dictionary definitions of "defalcation" to be "not particularly helpful").
207 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 404
(1950) ("Words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning unless they are technical terms
or words of art.").
208 See UTSA § 1 cmt.
209. See EIG, supra note 184, at 4-5.
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meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the
rest of the law." 210

Thus, each statutory provision should be read with reference to the whole
act, 211 which in the case of the DTSA may include the uncodified "Sense of
Congress" and the EEA as amended by the DTSA. 212

5. Other Canons ofStatutory Construction
Over the years, courts have developed a large number of discretionary
canons to assist in interpreting statutes. 213 Thus, although the rule that a
statute should be interpreted in accordance with its language is "the
preeminent canon of statutory interpretation," other canons may be utilized
where appropriate. 214 However, while these canons of construction can
prove useful, they are not mandatory and cannot be applied if inconsistent
with congressional intent. 215 Rather, they "are designed to help judges
determine the Legislature's intent as embodied in particular statutory
language" and "other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can
overcome their force." 216 Also, one canon may be countered by another,
making it difficult to predict which of them a court will apply. 217
How canons of statutory interpretation are likely to be applied to the
DTSA are examined in Part IV; for present purposes, it is worth highlighting
a few of them, particularly those that may lead federal courts to rely on state
law (including the UTSA and cases that interpret it) when interpreting the
meaning of the DTSA.

210. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (quoting Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
211. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94
95 (1993); Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entm't Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123-24 (1989).
212. See EIG, supra note 184, at 35 (discussing the difference between a statement of
purpose and a sense of Congress).
213. For a complete list, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP R. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 817-18 (4th ed. 2007). See also generally Llewellyn, supra
note 207.
214. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004).
215. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).
216. Chickasaw Nation v. U.S., 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
217. See POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236-37 (2014).
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a) The Borrowed Statute Rule
Since the DTSA is based upon the earlier adopted UTSA, as well as
some aspects of federal trademark and whistleblower laws and the rules of
civil procedure, the most significant of the canons of construction is likely
to be the "borrowed statute rule." This rule provides that when Congress
borrows a statute from another source, it also implicitly adopts prior
interpretations placed on that statute, absent an express statement to the
contrary. 218 However, this canon only applies if the interpretation in
question has garnered widespread acceptance, and it does not apply if the
federal statute departs from the borrowed statute in "significant ways." 219
Moreover, as noted previously, there is a difference between the specific
incorporation of another statute into a federal law and a general reference
to state law. 220
The borrowed statute rule is most relevant to language from the
UTSA that is directly incorporated into the DTSA, such as the definition of
misappropriation. This helps explain why many have been quick to assume
that UTSA jurisprudence will likely apply to the DTSA. However, because
the UTSA itself is not a state statute, but rather a privately-established
uniform law that has been adopted (sometimes with modifications) by
individual states, it is not clear that federal courts will adopt interpretations
based on the wording and commentary of the UTSA itself, as opposed to
state judicial decisions that have interpreted the enacted version of the
UTSA within their jurisdiction. This is significant because, while the
adoption of the UTSA by the states is much more uniform than the
proponents of the DTSA asserted, there are differences in how states have
interpreted and applied several key provisions of the UTSA. Additionally,
due to the direct incorporation of language from the UTSA into the DTSA,
whether a federal court looks to the UTSA or the forum state's version of
the UTSA, it is likely to apply the law that existed as of the date of the

218. See Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (adopting the several states
definition of "punitive damages"); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66
(1987) (holding that because BRISA contained nearly identical language to the LMRA,
BRISA must be interpreted in accordance with the LMRA).
219. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 581 (1994) (declining to construe the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 in accordance with prior judicial interpretations of
the District of Columbia statute upon which the Act was based).
220. See Pathak, supra note 179, at 827 n.17 (listing examples offederal laws that take
the latter approach).
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DTSA's enactment. 221 Finally, as discussed further below, the borrowed
statute rule will not necessarily serve to fill gaps in the DTSA, unless federal
courts are willing to use state judicial decisions that have filled those gaps.
If the federal courts choose to fill gaps themselves, will they use the UTSA
and its commentary, the law of the forum state, the law of another state, or
common law as reflected in the Restatement series?
b) Presumption in Favor of the Common Law
Another canon of statutory construction states that "when a statute
covers an issue previously governed by the common law, [courts] must
presume that 'Congress intended to retain the substance of the common
law. "' 222 This canon is particularly strong with respect to individual words
and phrases that are not otherwise defined in a federal statute. 223 However,
if a federal court determines that applying a common law definition or
tradition is inconsistent with the federal statutory purpose, it will depart
from the common law. 224
As the history of U.S. trade secret law reveals, there is a rich body of
common law related to trade secrets dating back nearly two centuries, 225
making the common law's application to the DTSA plausible. 226 Much of
221. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. Fortunately, because the USTA
has been in existence for nearly forty years, much of its terminology is well-settled,
particularly in states where it was adopted during the last century, but there remain some
issues that are unclear, such as the meaning of"independent economic value." See Robert
Damion Jurrens, Fool Me Once: U.S. v. Aleynikov and the Theft of Trade Secrets
Clarification Act of 2012, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 833, 835 (2013) (describing the
widespread adoption of the UTSA over the past thirty-nine years).
222. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (relying upon
the common law "first sale doctrine" to interpret language in the 1976 Copyright Act)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).
223. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (common
law definition ofemployee); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1991)
(state corporation law); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40
(1989) (common law of agency).
224. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 593-95 (1990) (refusing to follow the
common law meaning of "bribery" because doing so would be plainly inconsistent with
the statutory purpose); Consolidated Rail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542-44 (1994).
225. See supra Section II.A.
226. Cf Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010) (explaining that common law
limitations on the scope of patentable subject matter apply, despite the fact that they are
not included in the text of the Patent Act: "While not required by the statutory text, these
exceptions are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be 'new and
useful.' And, in any case, the exceptions have defined the statute's reach as a matter of
statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.").
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this common law is also reflected in both the text and commentary to the
UTSA, including the common law rules that trade secrets do not include the
general skill and knowledge of an employee and that reverse engineering
and independent development are not acts of misappropriation. 227 But there
are other common law principles that are critical to trade secret law that are
not expressly set forth in either the UTSA or the DTSA, such as the law
governing the creation of duties of confidentiality and the ownership of
trade secrets. Moreover, application of this canon to the DTSA seems
inappropriate with respect to common law principles that the UTSA was
designed to supersede or replace. For instance, at the time of the UTSA's
adoption, there was a split of authority regarding the availability and proper
length of injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriation. 228 Some courts
held that injunctive relief could be granted as a penalty and be perpetual, 229
but the drafters of the UTSA rejected this view in favor of placing limits on
the length of injunctive relief. 230 Additionally, when coupled with the
preference for using the law of the forum state, application of this canon
may mean the common law of trade secrecy would be applied by federal
courts sitting in Massachusetts and New York (two states that have yet to
adopt the UTSA), but not elsewhere.
c) In Pari Materia
The canon of construction known as in pari materia holds that similar
statutes should be interpreted similarly, 231 although courts may interpret a
statute differently from its predecessor statutes if the purpose of the

227. UTSA § 1 cmt.
228. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., Permanent Injunctive Relief for Trade Secret
Misappropriation Without an Express Limit Upon Its Duration: The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act Reconsidered, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 187-91 (2011) (describing
different "common law lines of authority" regarding "the availability and duration of
permanent injunctions restraining misappropriation of trade secrets").
229. See, e.g., Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App. 1973).
230. See UTSA § 2 cmt. ("Although punitive perpetual injunctions have been granted
... Section 2( a) of [the UTSA] adopts the position of the trend of authority limiting the
duration of injunctive relief."); see also Sandeen, supra note 4, at 514, 519, 532-33
(describing the UTSA's position on the duration of injunctive relief).
231. See, e.g., Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1992) (interpreting the
definition of "related to" in accordance with prior definitions under different statutory
schemes); see also TWA, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 432-33
(1989); Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 750-52 (1988); Wimberly v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 517 (1987); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 101-06 (1993).
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legislation suggests material differences between the two. 232 Because the
DTSA's whistleblower provision is not based upon common law or
borrowed from a state statute, this canon may be applied because there are
a number of existing whistleblower provisions under federal law. 233
Additionally, this canon, together with the rule of lenity, raises issues
related to Congress' decision to place the DTSA within an existing criminal
statute and thereby adopt preexisting language originally interpreted for
another purpose. In this regard, for important constitutional reasons,
including concerns about vagueness and overbreadth, criminal statutes are
generally scrutinized with more care. 234 As a result, federal court decisions
in criminal cases under the EEA are likely to constrain a broad interpretation
of the DTSA.
d) The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is a canon of statutory construction that is primarily
applied to criminal statutes, but can also apply to the interpretation of civil
penalties. 235 Generally, "it leads [courts] to favor a more lenient
interpretation of a criminal statute 'when after consulting traditional canons
of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous statute. "' 236 There
is a constitutional dimension to this rule that is based upon the demands of
due process; that criminal statutes not be vague and overbroad as written
and applied. 237 Thus, as with the previous canon, because Congress
amended the EEA to add a private civil cause of action (instead of creating
a separate civil cause of action outside of the EEA), interpretations of the
EEA for purposes of criminal prosecutions are likely to influence how the
same language is interpreted for civil purposes. 238 For instance, issues
concerning the scope of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction have
232. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 522-25 (1994).
233. See e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a)-(b) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78U-6 (2012); 7 U.S.C.
§ 28 (2012).
234. See City ofHous. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 (1987) (ruling that city ordinance
regarding obstruction of a police officer in discharge of duty was unconstitutionally
overbroad).
235. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 16 (2011)
(regarding an anti-retaliation provision, finding statute did not warrant application of rule
of lenity).
236. Id.; see also Ero, supra note 184, at 30-31.
237. See EIG, supra note 184, at 30; see also generally Shon Hopwood, Clarity in
Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695 (2017) (explaining the purpose and history of
the "rule oflenity" for interpreting criminal statutes).
238. See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11-12 & n. 8 (2004) (interpreting "crime
of violence" in criminal statute and applying it to noncriminal deportation context).
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already arisen under the EEA. 239 Because the DTSA uses similar language,
one can expect rulings concerning the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear
EEA cases to also define the scope ofjurisdiction under the DTSA.

6. Legislative History
Opinions concerning the role of legislative history in statutory
interpretation differ, ranging from those who believe that legislative history
is irrelevant and should never be consulted, to those who assert that
legislative history has long been, and should remain, an important tool of
statutory construction. 240 As a critic of legislative history, Justice Scalia
explained: "In analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text ... not
by 'psychoanalyzing those who enacted it. "' 241 However, not all federal
judges hold Justice Scalia's perspective. Moreover, the use of legislative
history often depends upon its nature and purpose. 242 Legislative intent
language that is set forth in the legislation itself will often be consulted.
Additionally, even if federal courts are unwilling to use legislative history
for purposes of statutory interpretation, they may consider it as part of the
interstitial lawmaking process.
B.

FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND RULES FOR FILLING GAPS

Despite the rules of statutory interpretation, the meaning of a statute
cannot always be determined by the statute itself-particularly if the text of
the statute is silent on an issue. In these situations, and sometimes dependent
on the same sources, federal courts may elect to fill gaps in federal statutes
and make federal common law. 243

239. See infra Section IV.A.I.
240. Compare GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATU TES 31-43
(1982), with ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 31 (1997).
241. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 270-71 (2000) (quoting Bank One Chi.,
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment)).
242. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act is often relied upon by federal
judges, in part, because it consists of numerous reports that were prepared during an
extensive drafting process. See e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 743 (1989).
243. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)
("[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal
law making is a basic responsibility of the federal courts."); see also Weinberg, supra note
201, at 838 ("When the relevant sovereign is identified to be 'the nation,' we know that
any law for the issue, state or federal, will be fashioned on the basis of, or constrained by
limits reflecting, national policy concerns.").
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When applied, the process of federal lawmaking to fill gaps in a
statutory scheme consists of two basic steps. 244 First, it must be determined
if federal courts have the "competence" (power) to make federal common
law. At this step, federal courts frequently look at legislative history to
determine if Congress intended to leave certain issues to the federal
lawmaking process. 245 Such intent may be express or implied. Generally,
the less detailed a federal statute, the more likely that Congress intended the
federal courts to fill gaps. Second, if power to make federal law exists,
federal courts then must determine which body of law to use to fill the
gaps. 246 While the Supreme Court has stated a preference for the use of the
law of the forum state,247 for a variety ofreasons discussed in Section III.B,
courts might look to other sources of law for guidance, such as, in the case
of the DTSA, the UTSA and its commentary.
In some circles, the notion that federal courts actually make law is an
anathema, but, in fact, lawmaking is a long-standing and necessary part of
the judicial process. 248 For a variety of reasons, including the inability or
political unwillingness of Congress to address certain issues, federal laws
are often written with insufficient detail. 249 Consider the language ofsection
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which is a single, brief sentence. 250 Because
of its brevity, federal courts have been required to both interpret its meaning
and fill numerous gaps in its text, including the crucial early decision to read

244. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514.
245. See Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretative Methodology and Delegations to Courts:
Are "Common Law Statutes" Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (noting that "explicit delegations of substantive
lawmaking power to courts are rare" and giving the Federal Rules of Evidence as one
example). The Sherman Antitrust Act is frequently cited as an example of implicit
lawmaking power.
246. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4518.
247. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) ("[W]e have
indicated that federal courts should 'incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of
decision,' unless 'application of [the particular] state law [in question] would frustrate
specific objectives of the federal programs.'" (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979))).
248. See Hinderlider v. La Palata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938) (decided on the very same day as Erie); see also Henry Friendly, In Praise ofErie
And ofthe New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964).
249. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4516 ("The need for interstitial lawmaking
arises as a consequence of the practical reality that it is impossible for Congress to draft
any statute in sufficient detail so that it is completely comprehensive and
comprehensible.").
250. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (2012).
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the word "unreasonable" into the statute. 251 Congress always has the power
to change or supersede law developed through this process, but it does not
always have the will or the votes to do so. 252
1. Determining the Power ofFederal Courts to Fill Gaps
The first step in the process is for federal courts to determine if they
have the authority to make federal common law to fill gaps. The clearest
case of such power is a federal statute that indicates congressional intent for
courts to fill gaps in the statute, often coupled with language concerning the
law to be used. 253 The more difficult cases, particularly in recent years,
involve diversity cases based upon state law. 254 Between these extremes are
federal question cases based upon a federal statute where an implied
delegation by Congress of lawmaking authority to federal courts would
have to be found. 255 Sometimes the failure of Congress to provide sufficient
specificity is seen as granting such power; other times it requires that the
gaps remain until Congress acts. 256 As the Wright & Miller treatise explains:
251. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also
Nat'! Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("The [Sherman
Act's] legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give shape
to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common law tradition ...."). The Lanham
Act is an example of a federal intellectual property law that required significant gap-filling
that was more often based upon the development of federal common law than state law.
Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law's Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
252. See City of Milwaukee v. Ill. & Mich., 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) ("Federal
common law is a 'necessary expedient' ... and when Congress addresses a question
previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for . . .
lawmaking by federal courts disappears." (quoting Comm. for Consideration of Jones Falls
Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976))).
253. This may involve state law being expressly incorporated into federal law by
reference without the direct incorporation of the language of a state statute. See Pathak,
supra note 179; Abbe R. Gluck, Our {National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2020
(2014) (detailing circumstances where Congress has adopted federal laws but then directed
federal courts to use state law on specified issues). Two sections of the DTSA provide
examples of references to other laws: one directs Congress to look at a provision of the
federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(l l) (2012), for guidance; the other directs federal
courts to look at state law governing restraints of trade. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(G)
(Supp. IV 2016); id. § 1836(b)(3)(i).
254. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (holding in a diversity case
that the California rule of decision, rather than a federal rule, governs petitioner's tort
liability).
255. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4516.
256. See, e.g., Elsevier, Inc. v. Comprehensive Microfilm & Scanning Servs., Inc., No.
3:10-cv-2513, 2012 WL 727943, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012) (declining to fill a gap to
find a right of contribution under the Lanham Act).
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[T]he process of filling the interstices is at some fundamental level
an inquiry into congressional intent. But the enterprise of
ascertaining this intent is somewhat artificial, because the issues
raised in disputes over federal common law competence often are
matters Congress simply did not contemplate or, for whatever
reason, chose to ignore. Accordingly, the process of filling a
statutory "gap" becomes an exercise in assigning significance to
silence or inadvertent omission. 257

The realities of the federal lawmaking process--coupled with the policy
behind some Supreme Court Justices' reluctance to use legislative history
in statutory interpretation--explains why there is an increasing insistence
that Congress more clearly express its intent, along with some federal
courts' refusals to fill gaps in the absence of such expression of intent. 258
But when the necessity of gap-filling remains, and where Congress has
signaled that federal courts can fill gaps, they will do so.
With respect to the DTSA, courts are not dealing with a statute that lacks
direction from Congress, but they are not dealing with a gap-less statute
either. In fact, at the one hearing on the DTSA in 2015, a senator commented
that it is impossible for Congress to adopt a perfect law. 259 Thus, as with
other federal statutes-including the federal patent, copyright, and
trademark statutes 260-it is likely that federal courts will find both the need
and the power to fill gaps in the DTSA. Because decisions concerning the
nature and extent of those gaps, and the law that is used to fill them, may
differ among federal courts (at least until the Supreme Court decides an
257. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4516.
258. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (2000)
("[W]e are unable to discern any basis in federal statutory or common law that allows
federal courts to fashion the relief urged by petitioner ... .");see also PM Grp. Life Ins.
Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Tr., 953 F. 2d. 543 (9th Cir. 1992).
259. Protecting Trade Secrets: The Impact of Trade Secret Theft on American
Competitiveness and Potential Solutions to Remedy This Harm: Hearing on S. 1890 and
H.R. 3326 Before the Full S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l 14th Cong. (2015) (statement of
Sharon Sandeen, Professor of Law, Harnline University School of Law),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 12-02- l 5%20Sandeen%20Testimony
.pdf; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Induce the
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. l, 17 (2007) ("[I]fthe goal is to mobilize the public
to focus its attention on Congress, then it makes sense to choose a default rule that places
the burden on the regulated industries to lobby for preemptive legislation, rather than one
that places the burden on those anti-preemption interests to lobby for a waiver of
preemption.").
260. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (holding that
non-naturally-occurring microorganisms are patentable under expansive language of 35
u.s.c. § 101).
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issue), the "imperfect" aspects of the DTSA are apt to lead to a lack of
uniformity. 261

2. Deciding What Law to Use to Fill Gaps and to Make
Specialized Federal Common Law
Assuming that federal competence to fill gaps exists, the second step in
the federal common lawmaking process is to determine what law should be
used to help fill the gaps. The Wright & Miller treatise notes that the power
of federal courts to make federal common law is not a high hurdle; the more
difficult question is whether federal courts can do so in a manner that
"displaces" state law. 262 In other words, although a federal statute is
involved, the principles enunciated in Erie mean that the process must still
pay due respect to state law. The critical language of Erie states:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not
a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common
law.263

Importantly, gap-filling under the Erie doctrine also has relevance
where the applicable "act of Congress" does not directly address an issue. 264
As Justice Scalia explained in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, a case in which
the Court refused to displace state law:
In answering the central question of displacement of [state] law,
we of course would not contradict an explicit federal statutory
provision. Nor would we adopt a court-made rule to supplement
federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed;
matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are gresumably left
subject to the disposition provided by state law. 2

261. See, e.g., Sandeen, supra note 31.
262. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514 ("[T]here seems to be an easily
satisfied threshold for finding sufficient federal interests to justify federal competence, yet
... there is a reluctance to find that the federal interest is sufficiently strong to justify
displacing of forum state law.").
263. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
264. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (applying the
definition of "children" used in the forum state to fill a gap in the 1909 Copyright Act).
265. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (internal citations omitted).
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This means that when filling gaps in the DTSA, federal courts will be
inclined to consider the law of the forum state first, particularly with respect
to language borrowed from state trade secrets law, which is the same
allegedly non-uniform law that the DTSA's supporters invoked to justify
the law's adoption. Whether and to what extent courts will rely upon sources
of law other than the law of the forum state (including, in the case of the
DTSA, the UTSA and its commentary) is, as the Wright & Miller treatise
explains, "very complicated." 266
In an attempt to make sense of the jurisprudence, the Wright & Miller
treatise identifies three principal exceptions to the preference for the law of
the forum state: (1) where there is "significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law"; 267 (2) where "the policy
of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal
restrictions they affect must be deemed governed by federal law"; 268 and (3)
where there is a "strong national or federal concern originating from the
Constitution, from tradition ... or from practical necessity," including the
need for uniformity. 269 The essential issue with respect to the DTSA is
whether Congress-which presumably was aware of the Supreme Court's
stated preference that federal courts use the law of the forum state to fill
gaps-intended for "new" federal common law to be developed instead.
Sometimes Congress explicitly states that a state law is preempted or
displaced, and other times preemption or displacement must be inferred. A
related question is whether any intent to displace the law of the forum state
means a total displacement or only a partial displacement.
a) Significant Conflict with Federal Interests
The issue of whether the law of the forum state poses a significant
conflict with a federal interest fust requires federal courts to determine the
federal interest involved. 270 Often, the text and legislative history of the
266. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514 ("Whether state law or federal law
controls matters not covered by the Constitution or an Act of Congress is a very
complicated question, one that does not yield to any simple answer in terms of the parties
to the suit, the basis of subject-matter jurisdiction, or the source of the right that is to be
enforced.") (emphasis added).
267. Id. (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 679
(2006)).
268. Id. (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
269. Id.
270. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (noting a failure of the
FDIC to identify a federal interest and standing for the proposition that the involvement of
a federal entity, alone, is not sufficient).
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federal statute indicates the interest, but courts have also found significant
conflicts with a federal interest in the absence of a federal statute. When a
federal statute like the DTSA is involved, the analysis often focuses on
whether Congress intended to "displace" the state law that would normally
be used to fill gaps. 271 This concept is similar to the issue of federal
preemption. of state law, but applies whether or not the federal statute
preempts state law because the required conflict "need not be as sharp as
must exist for ordinary preemption."272 Most cases in this category
"implicate the legal relationships and the proprietary interests of the United
States."273
The seminal case on the issue of "significant conflicts" is Clearfield
Trust Company v. United States, decided five years after Erie. 274 It involved
a check issued by the Works Projects Administration that was accepted for
payment by Clearfield Trust despite the endorsement being a forgery. 275 A
lawsuit to recover the amount of the check was brought by the United States
based upon an express guarantee. 276 Applying Pennsylvania law, the
District Court dismissed the lawsuit because the United States failed to give
timely notice of the forgery as required by Pennsylvania law. 277 The Court
reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decision, finding that "the
rights and duties of United States on commercial paper which it issues are
governed by federal law rather than state law," largely due to the
constitutional authority under which the commercial paper was issued. 278 In
determining which law to apply, the Court reasoned that the need for
national uniformity required adoption of a federal rule rather than the law
of the forum state.
After Clearfield, other cases followed suit, but as Justice Scalia
summarized in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, the cases of displacement of
state law are "few and restricted" and "limited to situations where there is a
'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law. "'279 One reason courts have found to ignore the law of the forum
271. See id.
272. Boyle v. U.S. Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
273. WRJGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4515.
274. 318 U.S. 363 (1943)
275. Id. at 365.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 366.
278. Id. at 375.
279. O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 85-86 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 651 (1963); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
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state is due to the "uniquely federal interests" involved, but the list of
"uniquely federal interests" is short. It includes cases involving: (1) the
obligations and rights of the United States under its contracts; 280 (2) the civil
liability of federal officials; 281 (3) federal procurement policy; 282 and (4)
"rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs." 283
Litigants that advocate for a particular interpretation of the DTSA may
argue that certain of its provisions, like the whistleblower provision, exhibit
a strong federal interest that justifies ignoring forum state law. But it is
difficult to make that claim with respect to most of the DTSA since it
explicitly recognizes the continuing relevance of state law on many issues.
b) Federal Law Dominates the Area Being Regulated
The second exception to the preference for applying the law of the
forum state-that "the policy of law is so dominated by the sweep of federal
statutes that legal restrictions which they affect must be deemed governed
by federal law"-focuses on the degree to which the federal law regulates
a particular area. In the absence of specific language, the issue of
displacement of state law is conceptually similar to the body of preemption
jurisprudence that examines whether federal law "so occupies the field" that
it can be presumed that Congress intended that state law be preempted. 284
As the Wright & Miller treatise explains, "[o]ne way to conceptualize [this]
judicial power ... is as an implied delegation by Congress of lawmaking
authority to the federal courts." 285 When the second exception applies, the
"strong preference" for application of law of the forum state can be flipped
on its head. 286
There are many examples of federal statutory schemes that have been
found to be so comprehensive that federal common law-not the law of the
forum state-should be used to fill gaps. These include the Labor

280. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
281. Id. at 505.
282. Id. at 505--06.
283. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979).
284. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987) (stating that the
Clean Water Act implicitly preempts state claims except where state claims are specifically
preserve by the Act's "saving clause").
285. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4516.
286. For instance, in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30
(1989), the Court expressed an "assumption" against dependence on state law. Id. at 43
44.
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Management Relations Act, 287 the Fair Labor Standards Act, 288 the National
Flood Insurance Program, 289 and the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). 290 But the dominance of a federal statute does not
always lead to total displacement of the law of the forum state, and even
when a court finds an intent to displace forum state law, a principle of state
law still may be adopted as federal common law. 291 Thus, although Congress
may have the constitutional power to displace state law, sometimes it
indicates a preference not to do so. 292 Also, other principles often tip the
balance against displacement of state law, explaining why this area of
jurisprudence is so complicated.
There is little indication in the text or legislative history of the DTSA
that Congress intended to displace state law when filling gaps in the DTSA.
To the contrary, the DTSA incorporates several provisions of state law
either directly or by reference. It also contains a provision which explicitly
states that the DTSA does not preempt or displace state remedies. 293 But the
DTSA also contains provisions that are new to trade secret law, or that
concern procedural or administrative aspects of the federal courts. As

287. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4 ("The Supreme Court ... [held] that
Section 30l(a) of the [Labor Management Relations] Act ... authorizes federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining
agreements.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).
288. See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, 711 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir.
2013) ("[T]here is an interest in legal predictability that is served by applying the same
standard of successor liability [federal common law] either to all federal statutes that
protect employees or to none.").
289. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514 n.38 ("Because the National Flood
Insurance Program is a statutory program 'conceived to achieve policies which are national
in scope, and since the federal government participates extensively in the program ... it is
clear that the interest of uniformity ... mandates the application of federal law' ...."
(quoting Flick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 2000))).
290. Id. n.19 ("It is well settled that federal common law applies ... to interpret the
provisions of an ERISA benefit plan." (quoting Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp. Union
Emp.'s Supplemental Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1999))).
291. The Bankruptcy Code is an example ofa comprehensive federal statute where the
law of the forum state is applied on many issues, but on other issues the federal courts have
developed federal common law. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979),
superseded in part by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 ("The
Bankruptcy Act does include provisions invalidating certain security interests as
fraudulent, or as improper preferences over general creditors. Apart from these provisions,
however, Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a
bankrupt's estate to state law.").
292. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54.
293. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
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discussed further below, these provisions of the DTSA are most likely to
result in the development of specialized federal common law to fill gaps.
c) Strong National or Federal Concern Originating from the
Constitution, Tradition, or Practical Necessity
On the surface, the third exception to the preference for forum state law
may seem similar to the fust two, but it often arises in situations where there
is no federal statute. It "consists of those actions involving matters that are
drawn by implication from the Constitution or based upon tradition or
necessity."294 An example is the decision of the Supreme Court in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to
recognize a private right of action for violation of the Fourth Amendment. 295
But even the seemingly simple principle of looking for federal laws based
upon constitutional provisions cannot necessarily override all state law, as
cases involving the Patent and Copyright Acts reveal. 296
With respect to matters oftradition and necessity, it has been recognized
that federal courts can extend immunity to legislators, 297 regulate
controversies between states, 298 and create federal law governing admiralty
and maritime suits. 299 This may also include trade secrets law. For instance,
in a trade secret case involving the importation of goods into the United
States, the Federal Circuit rejected application of the trade secret law of
Illinois, explaining:
The question under section 337 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] is not
whether the policy choices of a particular state's legislature or
those reflected in a particular state's common law rules should be
vindicated, but whether goods imported from abroad should be
excluded because of a violation of the congressional policy of
294. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4517.
295. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
296. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4517 n.41 ("When a state claim has an extra
element 'so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright [or patent] infringement
claim,' the state law escapes preemption." (quoting Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v.
Victor CNC Sys. Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1440 (1993))).
297. See id. § 4517 ("[T]wo decades before Bivens ... the Court extended to state
legislators the immunity provided to federal legislators by the Speech and Debate Clause
of the Constitution." (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951))).
298. See id. ("[T]he power of federal courts to create federal common law to govern
controversies between states was recognized by the Supreme Court quite early and is
extremely well-established.").
299. See id. ("The power of the federal courts to create federal common law governing
admiralty and maritime suits ... is well established, undoubtedly in recognition of the
necessity of establishing a national body of substantive law.").
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protecting domestic industries from unfair competition, which is
a distinctly federal concern as to which Congress has created a
federal remedy. In light of the fact that section 337 deals with
international commerce, a field of special federal concern, the case
for applying a federal rule of decision is particularly strong. 300

If a substantive issue of trade secret law arose, the court stated that it would
apply principles of trade secret law as expressed in the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition, the UTSA, and the EEA. 301
As with the previous exceptions to the preference for the law of the
forum state, the DTSA does not reflect such a strong issue of federal
concern that state law will never be used to fill gaps, but there are individual
parts of the DTSA that may involve strong federal interests "originating
from the Constitution, tradition or practical necessity." This includes the
DTSA' s jurisdictional clause and extraterritoriality provision. 302 Thus,
these provisions are more likely to result in the development of specialized
federal common law than provisions borrowed from state or common law.

d) Other Principles
In addition to the three broad categories of cases identified by the
Wright & Miller treatise, there are a number of other principles that might
spin the displacement of state law analysis one way or the other and that are
often addressed under the three categories discussed above or as part of the
statutory interpretation process. The principles that may affect application
of the DTSA include:

•

The desire for a uniform national standard; 303

•

The administration of the federal courts, includin~ docket
control and burdens that are placed on the courts; 04

300. TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661F.3d1322, 1327 (2011).
301. Id. at 1328. It remains to be seen if federal courts will now apply the DTSA in
such situations or continue to develop federal common law for such purposes.
302. See infra Parts IV.A.I, IV.A.5.
303. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987) ("[State common
law] nuisance standards often are 'vague' and 'indeterminate. The application of numerous
States' laws would only exacerbate the vagueness and resulting uncertainty.").
304. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514, n.38 ("A federal court may use its
supervisory power to formulate procedural rules to 'administer its docket and preserve the
integrity of the judicial process."' (quoting United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 514
(2000))).
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•
•

Where the issue at hand involves the equitable powers of
the court- 305
'
Matters related to access to court records; 306 and

•

Where different language is used. 307
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The principles that tend to spin the analysis away from the displacement
of state law include:
•

Matters traditionally covered by common law; 308

•

Matters on which no federal common law exists; 309

•

Where state law is largely undisturbed by the federal
statute· 310

•

Where "private parties have entered legal relationships
with the expectation that their rights and obligations
would be governed by state-law standards;"311 and

•

Judicial reluctance to create federal common law
regarding criminal matters. 312

'

As the foregoing indicates, a common argument in favor of federal
courts exercising federal lawmaking power and displacing the law of the
305. See, e.g., LaShawn A. by Moore v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("[A] federal court has broad equitable powers, and may, in certain instances, override state
or local law for the purpose of enforcing a decree designed to remedy violations of federal
law.") (internal citations omitted) (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
306. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (recognizing
a common law right to inspect and copy judicial records).
307. See, e.g., Canova v. Shell Pipeline Co., 290 F.3d 753, 756-57 (5th Cir. 2002)
(applying general common law principles because state law used a different terminology).
308. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 183 (1989) (explaining the
Court's "reluctan[ce] to federalize matters traditionally covered by state common law")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).
309. See, e.g., Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Where, as here,
there is no extant body of federal common law in the area of law implicated by the statute,
we may use state law to inform our interpretation of the [relevant] statutory language.").
310. See, e.g., PM Grp. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Tr., 953 F.2d 543, 546
(9th Cir. 1992) ("The case for adopting state law rules is strongest where Congress
legislates interstitially, leaving state law largely undisturbed.").
311. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991 ).
312. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2013) ("With
few exceptions, federal courts have abjured the power to fashion a federal common law of
crime, holding that the Constitution generally assigns the job of specifying federal crimes
and punishments to the Legislative Branch.").
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forum state is the asserted need for uniformity. 313 However, as noted by
Justice Scalia in 0 'Melveny & Meyers, if the federal courts accepted the
uniformity argument in every case, they would "be awash in federal
common law rules." 314 Thus, federal courts often accept a lack ofuniformity
either because the federal statute explicitly or implicitly does so, or because
another of the above-listed principles applies to counterbalance the asserted
benefits of uniformity. 315
For instance, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court overturned a decision of the Court of Appeals that adopted as federal
common law a rule of the American Law Institute (ALI) instead of the law
of the forum state. 316 Application of the ALI's "universal demand rule" had
resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint under the federal
Investment Company Act because it abolished the futility exception still
applicable in the forum state. Citing Clearfield, the Court explained:
[O]ur cases indicate that a court should endeavor to fill the
interstices offederal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules
only when the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for
nationwide standards. 317

Thus, it was not error for the lower court in Kamen to fill gaps in the
federal statute, but it drew its rule from the wrong source. The
countervailing principle against national uniformity was that the case
involved an area of law "in which private parties have entered legal
relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be
governed by state-law standards." 318
With respect to matters typically covered by common law, the best way
to think of the principle is as a commonsense constraint on the power of
federal courts to make "new" law when state law has already spoken on an
issue. As Justice Kennedy explained in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union,
"[a]lthough we must do so when Congress plainly directs, as a rule we
313. See Frost, supra note 31, at 1574; Sandeen, supra note 261.
314. 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
315. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2240 (2014)
("Congress not infrequently permits a certain amount of variability by authorizing a federal
cause of action even in areas oflaw where national uniformity is important.").
316. 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
317. Jd.at98.
318. Id. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-729, 739-40
(1979) (commercial law); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210
(1946) (property law)); see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81
(1956) (borrowing from family law because of primary state responsibility).
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should be and are reluctant to federalize matters traditionally covered by
state common law." 319 Thus, as a general rule, "[s]tatutes which invade the
common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to
the contrary is evident" 320 and provided the common law is "well
established. " 321
Based upon the foregoing, the decision to displace state law with "new"
federal common law is most prevalent when Congress so directs and when
it legislates in an area without a rich common law backdrop. Mark McKenna
explained this phenomenon with respect to the Lanham Act (the federal law
governing trademarks) when he noted that the paucity of existing state
trademark law led to the development of a federal common law to fill gaps
in the Lanham Act. 322 Interestingly, the absence ofa body ofstate trademark
law was the result of the timing of the Erie decision, which occurred several
years before the Lanham Act's adoption, as well as the Erie Court's
rejection of "federal general common law," including that governing
federally registered trademarks before 1938. Because states did not have
much time before the Lanham Act's adoption in 1946 to develop a robust
set of state trademark principles to replace the pre-Erie federal common
law, the federal courts did so. 323
The same cannot be said of the DTSA, which was adopted against
the backdrop of a robust set of state trade secret principles that were largely
put in place after-and as a result of-Erie. 324 But an issue with respect to
the DTSA is whether the common law of trade secrecy will continue to be
applied by federal courts when such law was displaced in most states by the
UTSA. On one hand, the UTSA changed (or at least settled) some common
law principles of trade secret law that developed before the UTSA was
adopted, but on the other hand, its drafting history and commentary contain
statements expressing an intent not to change common law, at least too

319. 491U.S.164, 183 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
321. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); cf PM
Grp. Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Tr., 953 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The
case for adopting state law rules is strongest where Congress legislates interstitially,
leaving state law largely undisturbed. Under those circumstances, comity and common
sense counsel against exercising the power of federal courts to fashion rules of decision as
a matter of federal common law.").
322. McKenna, supra note 251.
323. Id.
324. See Sandeen, supra note 4.
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much. 325 Thus, federal courts could, and arguably should, look to the UTSA
for the expression of the common law of trade secrecy. If they look instead
to the trade secrecy provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, some differences between the interpretation and application
of the UTSA and the DTSA may emerge.

3. Deciding Which State is the Forum State
When a federal court decides to apply the law of the forum state, either
because Congress directed it to do so or because it follows the Supreme
Court's preference, a separate issue arises regarding which state's law
applies. 326 This is due to the fact that the choice of law rules of the forum
state (including enforceable choice of law provisions of a contract) might
require another state's law to apply. 327 The extent to which the issue arises
in DTSA cases and how the choice of law affects outcomes remains to be
seen, but the issue has already arisen in cases under the UTSA. 328

4. Deciding What Law Will Be Used to Displace the Law ofthe
Forum and Create Specialized Federal Common Law
The last step in the process of gap-filling is to decide what the federal
law will be. In doing so, federal courts create a body of "specialized federal
common law" which may be based upon a host of laws and legal principles
(including state law) or developed from whole cloth. As the Supreme Court
explained in United States v. Standard Oil Co. ofCalifornia, a case decided
the same year as Erie:
It is true, of course, that in many situations, and apart from any
supposed influence of the Erie decision, rights, interests and legal
relations of the United States are determined by application of
state law, where Congress has not acted specifically. In our choice
of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state
law.... In other situations, it may fairly be taken that Congress
has consented to application of state law, when acting partially in
relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make
other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed. And in

325. Id.
326. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4518.
327. U.S. bankruptcy courts have struggled with these issues in many cases. Id.
328. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 954 (2009)
(applying California law even though the case was filed in Wisconsin).
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still others state law may furnish convenient solutions in no way
inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal interest. 329

The goal of this process, although resulting in the development of federal
common law, is always to apply the intent of Congress. 330
Ironically, after deciding to displace state law, federal courts may decide
to adopt state legal principles as federal common law, but not necessarily
the law of the forum state. 331 This can happen, for instance, where the law
of the forum state is inconsistent with the purpose of the federal statute or
is outside the norm of the majority of state laws. As the Miller & Wright
treatise explains:
In creating federal common law or determining its content, a court
is free to choose any rule it deems appropriate, and it may look for
guidance to other federal contexts, to what it perceives to be first
principles, to considerations of equity and convenience, or to
forum state law. 332

The sources of law and legal principles that federal courts have used to
create federal common law include other federal laws, 333 uniform laws, 334
the "better reasoned" common law as expressed in the Restatement or
elsewhere, 335 and principles of equity. 336 But whether these resources are
used ultimately depends upon what each federal court deems appropriate
and, as a practical matter, what arguments are made by counsel.
For instance, in Mississippi Band ofChoctaw Indians v. Holyfield, after
the Court decided not to follow the law of the forum state (Mississippi), it
elected to apply the common law meaning of the term at issue. As the Court
329. 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations
omitted).
330. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1373 (2013)
(Ginsburg, J ., concurring) ("In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is
easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).
331. See, e.g., Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (1992) ("In
fashioning federal common law, courts do not look to the law of a particular state, but
rather should apply common-law doctrines best suited to furthering the goals ofERISA ..
. .");see also Pathak, supra note 179, at 838 ("The rule maker could have chosen to create
a uniform federal rule but it instead decided to adopt a rule from state law. As a formal
matter, therefore, the borrowed state law is actually federal law.").
332. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514.
333. Id.§ 4518 n.6.
334. Id. § 4518 n.9.
335. Id.
336. Id.§ 4518 n.5.
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explained, "[t]hat we are dealing with a uniform federal rather than a state
definition does not, of course, prevent us from drawing on general state-law
principles to determine 'the ordinary meaning of the words used. "' 337
Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 338 provides another
illustration of the process that a federal court may follow when a federal law
(in that case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) fails to specifically
address an issue. After first finding that neither a cited state rule of decision
nor a federal statute applied to answer the question at hand, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, held that federal common law applies to determine
the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by a federal court sitting in
diversity. 339 But having done so, he then looked to the law of the forum state
to decide what the "specialized federal common law" should be. 340
The copyright case of Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid341
is an example of the use of Restatement definitions to give meaning to a
federal statute. In Reid, the Court was required to determine the meanings
of "employee" and "scope of employment" as used in the 1976 Copyright
Act's definition of a work made for hire. 342 Because neither term was
defined in the Act itself, the Court decided to use the common law
definitions, explaining:
It is . . . well established that "[ w]here Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms." . . . In the past, when Congress has used the term
"employee" without defining it, we have concluded that Congress
intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship
as understood by common-law agency doctrine. 343
Thus, Reid is an example of a federal court applying the canon of
construction that favors application of common law, but one where the
Restatement's explication of common law is adopted instead ofthe common
law of the forum state.

337. Id.
338. 531U.S.497 (2001).
339. Id. at 508.
340. Id.
341. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
342. See id. at 739 ("The Act nowhere defines the terms 'employee' or 'scope of
employment."').
343. Id. at 739--40 (citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981); Perrin
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
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THE EFFECT OF SPECIALIZED FEDERAL COMMON LAW

As the foregoing sets forth, the development of "specialized federal
common law" is the last step in a hierarchical process designed to determine
the meaning of a federal statute. While federal courts that engage in this
process may make federal law from whole cloth, they often choose to adopt
the law of a state or a uniform law. In any case, the significance of creating
federal common law is that it "is truly federal law in the sense, by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause, [that] it is binding on state courts, as well as in the
federal courts. " 344
The importance of this with respect to the DTSA is that if federal courts
(and ultimately the Supreme Court) decide not to use the UTSA as the basis
for any specialized federal common law, over time the federal law of trade
secrecy may diverge from the UTSA. Imagine, for instance, if courts decide
to use the law of New York (a non-UTSA state) instead of the UTSA, either
for cases filed in New York or more broadly. Also, consider how the trade
secret law of a given state may change if state courts, in considering a DTSA
claim, 345 are required to apply federal common law to DTSA claims that are
considered alongside parallel claims brought under state trade secret law.
Depending upon what the federal common law is, either the two sets of laws
will tend to conform, or there will be two different sets of laws, state and
federal, leading to potentially divergent outcomes.

IV.

APPLYING THE INTERPRETATIVE RULES AND
METHODOLOGIES TO THE DTSA

In this Part, we explore some of the issues that are likely to arise as
federal courts apply the foregoing interpretive rules and methodologies to
the DTSA. First, we examine portions of the DTSA that are new to U.S.
trade secret law, including sections of the EEA that were amended by the
DTSA. Second, we address parts of the DTSA that were borrowed from the
UTSA and are expressly defined in the DTSA, such as "misappropriation."
Third, we consider how federal courts may deal with words and concepts in
the DTSA that were borrowed from the UTSA, but that are not defined.
Lastly, we provide a list of issues likely to arise in trade secret cases, but
which are not directly addressed by the DTSA.
344. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 175, § 4514.
345. The DTSA authorizes original but not exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts, see
18 U.S.C. § 1836(c) (Supp. IV 2016), meaning that state courts have concurrent authority
to decide claims under the DTSA. (Of course, a defendant sued in state court under the
DTSA can remove to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012).)
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INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE "NEW" LANGUAGE

On the surface, how federal courts should interpret and apply the
provisions of the DTSA that are "new" (that is, not contained in the UTSA
or the EEA) ostensibly presents the most straightforward of the four
scenarios because it should merely be a matter of determining congressional
intent as embodied in the statutory text, without any need to consider the
UTSA. However, the provisions in question have some ambiguities that
suggest courts may need to rely upon extrinsic sources for purposes of
statutory interpretation, if not gap-filling. 346 Moreover, several provisions
are procedural in nature and therefore involve issues where the federal
courts have significant experience. The more significant question is: which
extrinsic sources will federal courts look to and what role, if any, will the
UTSA and its commentary play in this analysis?
The "new" provisions of the DTSA include one that was the subject of
extensive discussion and amendment (the ex parte seizure provision); one
that was added late in the process and was not the subject of a public hearing
where testimony was taken (the whistleblower provision); and several less
detailed provisions, most of which deal with issues ordinarily considered to
be within the exclusive province of the federal government and its courts
(for instance, the federal courts' jurisdiction; the statute's extraterritorial
provision; and the criminal law provisions of the EEA).

1. The Commerce Clause Provision
The provision of the DTSA that creates a civil cause of action (section
1836) contains a jurisdictional clause with three distinct parts. 347 This
provision is based primarily upon Congress' Commerce Clause powers, 348
346. Although the two provisions in question are very detailed, gap-filling may be
needed for terms that are not defmed (such as the meaning of "disclosure" in the
whistleblower provision), but as noted previously, sometimes such issues are framed as
matters of statutory interpretation rather than gap-filling.
347. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836 (Supp. IV 2016) ("An owner of a trade secret that is
misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection ifthe trade secret is related
to a product or service ....").
348. See S. REP. No. 104-359, at 4 (1996) (explaining for the EEA that "the basis for
the protection of proprietary economic information is rooted in ... the power 'to regulate
Commerce ... among the several states"); S. REP. No. 114-220, at 14 (2016) ("This
jurisdictional nexus to interstate or foreign commerce is identical to the existing language
required for Federal jurisdiction over the criminal theft of a trade secret. ..."). Interestingly,
the House version of the DTSA as introduced also relied on the Patent and Copyright
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, as constitutional authority for the law, 161 CONG.
REC. H5772 (daily ed. July 29, 2015), even though the DTSA provides that it "shall not be
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but its language predates the DTSA because it is modeled after similar text
in its predecessor, the EEA. 349 It provides that:
An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a
civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a
product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or
foreign commerce. 350

What it means for trade secrets to be (1) "related to a product or service,"
(2) "used in, or intended for use in," and (3) "interstate or foreign
commerce" are the critical questions, but none of this terminology is further
defined in the DTSA. Nor is such terminology part of the UTSA or the
common law of trade secrecy. As a result, if it is deemed ambiguous, courts
will likely tum to precedents under the EEA and the language and
legislative history of the DTSA to determine the meaning of these phrases.
Based upon comments by the DTSA's proponents, some apparently
assume that the DTSA's jurisdictional requirement will be as easy for trade
secret owners to satisfy as it is for trademark owners under the Lanham
Act. 351 However, the jurisdictional language of the two laws is different.
Most importantly, the Lanham Act applies to "all commerce which may be
lawfully regulated by Congress," 352 whereas the DTSA is more
circumscribed. Moreover, even though the "in commerce" language of the
two statutes is similar and has been broadly interpreted under the Lanham
Act to apply to intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, 353 the DTSA' s jurisdiction appears narrower because (unlike the
Lanham Act) there must be actual or intended use of the secret "related to a
product or service" in "interstate or foreign commerce. " 354
To date, only a few cases have explored the jurisdictional provisions of
the EEA in depth, but those that do tend to suggest that it may be read
somewhat more narrowly than proponents assume. The constitutionality of
construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any other Act of
Congress." Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(g), 130 Stat. 381, 382 (2016).
349. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(l) (Supp. IV 2016), with id.§ 1832(a) (2012).
350. Id.§ 1836(b)(l) (Supp. IV 2016) (emphasis added).
351. The Lanham Act requires that the plaintiff plead and prove that it "used in
commerce" a reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of plaintiffs mark. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114, § 1125 (2012).
352. Id. § 1127.
353. See e.g., Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); Larry Harmon Pictures Corp. v. Williams Rest. Corp., 929 F.2d 662 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
354. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(l)(Supp. IV 2016).
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section 1832 as originally enacted in the EEA was first considered in United
States v. Hsu, a decision that includes language supporting a broad reading
of "related to." 355 In that case, the court refused to find the "related to"
terminology void for vagueness, noting:
We reject [defendant]'s argument that the term "related to or
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or
foreign commerce" is unacceptably vague .... We believe the
term "related to or included in" is readily understandable to one
of ordinary intelligence, particularly here where the defendant
appears to be well versed as to the relationship (and technological
differences) between "first generation" and "second generation"
taxol technology. 356

But such a ruling relied upon the specific facts of the case and portends the
need in every DTSA case to determine what "related to" means for the
specific goods or services at issue.
More recently, United States v. Aleynikov357 involved a criminal
prosecution under the original language of section 1832 of the EEA for the
alleged theft of source code related to Goldman Sachs' proprietary high
frequency trading system. 358 At that time, section 1832 required that the
allegedly misappropriated trade secret information be [ 1] "related to or
included in" [2] "a product that is" [3] "produced for or placed in interstate
or foreign commerce." 359 After first noting that the quoted language
included words of limitation (relying in part of the legislative history of the
EEA), the Second Circuit applied the provision's "natural meaning" and
found that it applied to two different groups of products: those that were
already "placed in" the market, and those that were "produced for" the
market. 360 The court also noted that as a criminal statute, any ambiguity
regarding the jurisdictional provision's scope "should be resolved in favor"
of the defendant consistent with the rule oflenity. 361 As a result, the court
was unwilling to read this language as broadly as the government urged,
finding that the alleged trade secret information was neither "placed in" or

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

40 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Id. at 627.
676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 75.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 82.
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"produced for" interstate or foreign commerce, and it therefore dismissed
the charges against the defendant. 362
Following Aleynikov, Congress quickly passed the Theft of Trade
Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, which amended the language of section
1832 so that it now reads: "related to a product or service used in or intended
for use in interstate or foreign commerce." 363 This language then became
the model for section 1836 of the DTSA. 364 Significantly, in drafting both
the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act and the DTSA, Congress did
not take up the Aleynikov court's invitation to exercise the full extent of its
Commerce Clause powers, instead continuing to use words of limitation,
specifically "related to." By borrowing the language of section 1832 for use
in section 1836, courts interpreting the language of section 1836 are likely
to apply precedent under section 1832 pursuant to the borrowed statute rule
and as affected by the rule of lenity.
In United States v. Agrawal, 365 a case decided after Congress changed
the jurisdictional language in the wake ofAleynikov, the same court reached
a different result, finding that jurisdiction existed in large part due to the
specific facts alleged in the indictment, thereby highlighting the fact
specific nature of the EEA's (and by extension, the DTSA's) jurisdictional
requirement. Rather than asserting that the purported trade secrets were
themselves a product sold in interstate commerce, the indictment alleged
that the subject trade secrets (confidential computer code) were "related to"
a trading system that was a "product" sold in interstate commerce. 366 In
dicta, the court briefly reviewed Supreme Court cases construing the phrase
"related to" suggesting both an expansive and narrow interpretation of the
EEA provision, ultimately concluding that it "need not delineate the outer
limits of [its] reach." 367
In addition, while the extent of the federal courts' jurisdiction is
obviously a matter of federal interest, principles of federalism nonetheless
may counsel in favor of a narrow reading of the DTSA's jurisdictional
requirement. In Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, the Supreme Court noted that
when Congress legislates in an area historically dominated by state law,
courts should not assume that the new federal statute eviscerates states'
jurisdiction entirely:
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id. at 81 (quoting Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859--60 & n.4 (1985)).
Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (2012).
See supra Section 11.E.
726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 245.
Id. at. 248.
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The judicial task in marking out the extent to which Congress has
exercised its constitutional power over commerce is not that of
devising an abstract formula .... We cannot, therefore, indulge in
the loose assumption that when Congress adopts a new scheme for
federal industrial regulation, it thereby deals with all situations
falling within the general mischief which gave rise to the
legislation. Such an assumption might be valid where remedy of
the mischief is the concern of only a single unitary government. It
cannot be accepted where the practicalities of federalism---or,
more precisely, the underlying assumptions of our dual form of
government and the consequent presuppositions of legislative
draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits---cut
across what might otherwise be the implied range of the
legislation. 368

In other words, because Congress' power is limited, there is a general rule
of statutory construction that "federal jurisdiction should be construed
strictly." 369 As the foregoing quote suggests, this rule is particularly strong
in areas where state law has typically governed, like trade secret law, and is
particularly true here, where Congress deliberately decided not to preempt
existing state trade secret law (except to the extent inconsistent with the
whistleblower provision). 370
Even if courts adopt a broad definition of interstate commerce
analogous to the Lanham Act, the practical application of the DTSA will
require plaintiffs to allege and establish facts that they are not required to
prove under the UTSA. Under the UTSA, trade secrets need not be used or
intended for use "in commerce" to be protected, 371 although available

368. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520 (1942).
369. See, e.g., United States v. Pethick, 513 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir.
2008) ("Statutes conferring jurisdiction must be strictly construed."); Boelens v. Redman
Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[S]tatutes conferring jurisdiction on
federal courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against federal
jurisdiction.").
370. See supra Part II.
371. For example, negative know-how is protected. See UTSA § 1 cmt. ("The
definition [of a trade secret] includes information that has commercial value from a
negative viewpoint, for example the results oflengthy and expensive research which proves
that a certain process will not work could be of great value to a competitor."); see also
generally Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX.
lNTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 416 (2007) (further explaining and critiquing the "negative know
how" theory of liability for misappropriation).
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remedies for misappropriation may be affected by non-use. 372 In contrast,
on its face, the statutory language of the DTSA requires that the plaintiff
plead and prove: ( 1) the existence of one or more trade secrets; (2) that those
trade secrets are "related to" goods or services; and (3) that the goods or
services are actually used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign
commerce. Moreover, principles of "jurisdictional sequencing"-which
generally require federal courts to determine whether they have jurisdiction
before rendering a decision on the merits-may require plaintiffs in trade
secret cases to prove these factual predicates before the applicable federal
court has power to grant preliminary relief, such as a civil seizure order. 373
To help determine the meaning of section 1836, federal courts may look
at contemporary dictionaries to define what "related to" means, but they are
not very helpful. One contemporary dictionary sets forth three definitions
for "related": (1) "connected in some way"; (2) "in the same family"; and
(3) "belonging to the same group because of shared characteristics,
qualities, etc." 374 The latter two definitions are inapt, and the first is
unsatisfying given that the purpose of the clause is to ensure that Congress
has the constitutional power to regulate the behavior in question, and a mere
"connection" may not pass muster. What if the trade secrets comprise only
a small part of a good? Should any connection suffice?
In addition, federal courts might consult the statutory context, canons of
construction, and legislative history, although these sources are not of much
help either in defining what Congress meant by "related to." It is likely,
however, that a plaintiff advocating for a broad interpretation will cite the
"Sense of Congress" provision of the DTSA 375 and argue that the term
should be broadly construed. However, no amount of expressed legislative
intent can override constitutional limits on Congress' power, and as
Aleynikov shows, courts are generally unwilling to interpret limiting
language of the sort in the DTSA to reach as broadly as the full scope of
Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
372. There is a significant difference between the "bona fide intent to use" provisions
of the Lanham Act and the "intended" language of the DTSA because no federal trademark
rights are conferred under the Lanham Act until an intent to use application is perfected.
373. See Alan M. Trammel, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1101
(2013) ("Jurisdictional sequencing taps into fundamental questions about the nature and
role of subject matter jurisdiction and what, if anything, a court may do before it has
established jurisdiction.").
374. RELATED, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016 ed.).
375. Defend Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 5, 130 Stat. 376, 383-84
(2016).
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Furthermore, the nature of the alleged trade secret, as well as whether
and how it is used, will obviously affect the jurisdictional analysis. Even
though a person of ordinary intelligence may know the meaning of "related
to," a factual question that is sure to arise concerns the quantum of
relationship that is needed. As an example, it is easy to see how the secret
formula for Coca-Cola376 "relates to" the end-product of a bottle of Coca
Cola, but what if the alleged trade secret is an unused, failed, or
discontinued formula for a new beverage? 377 Or what if the alleged trade
secret consists of information about employees who work for the Coca
Cola Company, but not the beverage itself? With respect to the as yet
unused formula, the DTSA requires proof of intent to use, but this phrase is
not defined, raising questions about how such intent will be established and
whether it needs to be "bona fide" like the Lanham Act requires. On its face,
there does not seem to be any basis to argue that so-called "negative
information" can be protected under the DTSA, as negative information is
not normally in use. 378

2. Ex Parte Civil Seizure Provision
One implication of the rules and methodologies for statutory
interpretation is that the more detailed a statutory provision is, the less likely
courts will rely upon extrinsic sources for meaning because they have more
words and statutory context to serve as guidance. Thus, it is possible that
federal courts will not need to rely much upon extrinsic sources to interpret
and apply the ex parte civil seizure provision, which is the lengthiest and
most detailed of the DTSA provisions. 379 Additionally, the fact that the civil
376. See Christian Chessman, A "Source" of Error: Computer Code, Criminal
Defendants, and the Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 212 (2017) (describing the
"legendary barriers" put up to protect the secret formula of Coca-Cola). Of course, the
formulation of Coca-Cola has changed over time-for example, it no longer contains
cocaine-so it is a misnomer to refer to it as a single "formula." See MARK PENDERGRAST,
FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND COCA-COLA (3d ed. 2013). And various sources have published
purported versions of the Coca-Cola recipe. See, e.g., The Recipe, THIS AMERICAN LIFE
https ://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/4 27I original-recipe/recipe (last
visited Dec. 22, 2017).
377. For example, Coca-Cola introduced a new formula for its signature beverage in
1985 that was unofficially dubbed "New Coke," but it quickly restored the old formula in
the face of widespread negative reaction. See Stephanie Clifford, Coca-Cola Deleting
'Classic 'from Coke Label, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/
31/business/media/3 l coke.html.
378. See also Seaman, supra note 8, at 351.
379. See Goldman, supra note 120, at 285 (noting that the ex parte seizure provision
makes up over forty percent of the DTSA's text).
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seizure provision is also largely a procedural rule means that federal courts,
when interpreting and applying it, are likely to apply federal principles.
However, there are reasons why the civil seizure provision may be
interpreted and applied with reference to other sources of law. First, the
DTSA explicitly requires courts to refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65 in determining if a civil seizure order should be granted. 380 Second, the
DTSA' s legislative history and language make clear that the ex parte seizure
provision is patterned after similar provisions of the Lanham Act (including
creating a cause of action for wrongful seizure), 381 thus inviting federal
courts to apply existing precedent under federal trademark law. There are
also numerous terms and phrases within the civil seizure provision that are
not expressly defined and for which extrinsic sources of information may
have to be consulted.
The interpretative challenges of the civil seizure provision begin early
when it states that a court may only issue such an order in "extraordinary
circumstances" and only for the purpose of seizing "property necessary to
prevent the propagation or dissemination of property." The terms
"extraordinary
circumstances,"
"property,"
"propagation,"
and
"dissemination" are not defined in the DTSA (nor in the EEA or UTSA),
meaning that federal courts are likely to resort to dictionaries and the
context of the DTSA to determine their meanings.
With respect to the requirement of "extraordinary circumstances," one
way to interpret the provision is that it is one of those flexible and
amorphous terms that Congress intended the federal courts to define over
time through case law, as it has done with other forms of interim relief like
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. 382 Another way
to interpret the "extraordinary circumstances" language is in light of its
context. For instance, one might argue that the "requirements for issuing
order" provision, in effect, defines what is meant by "extraordinary
circumstances." Specifically, the statutory requirement that federal courts
must make a finding that a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 would be "inadequate to
achieve the purpose of this paragraph" before ordering a seizure suggests

380. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. IV 2016).
381. See supra Part II (describing the legislative history).
382. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (holding
that a preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy").

896

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:829

that extraordinary circumstances require facts different in nature and
magnitude from those required for relief under Rule 65. 383
Unfortunately, rather than identify "extraordinary circumstances" that
justify the grant of an ex parte civil seizure order, the language of the civil
seizure provision seems to muddle the acts which constitute trade secret
misappropriation and fails to carefully distinguish between the separate and
distinct wrongs of "acquisition by improper means" and "disclosure or use
in violation of a duty of confidentiality." In so doing, the provision appears
to require proof of both more egregious and less egregious acts of trade
secret misappropriation than is typically required at common law or under
the USTA. It arguably requires more egregious acts by requiring proof of
direct misappropriation by "improper means." But then, by not explicitly
limiting the actionable circumstances to instances of wrongful acquisition
(such as cyber-espionage) or intentional breach of a duty of confidence, it
potentially makes any breach of a duty of confidence (or, more troublesome,
any conspiracy to breach a confidence,) the basis of a civil seizure order.
Under such circumstances, what constitutes "extraordinary circumstances"
remains unclear.
Another unclear part of the ex parte civil seizure provision requires that
the person against whom the seizure would be ordered have "actual
possession of ... the trade secret; and ... any property to be seized."
Although "property" is not defined in the DTSA, when read in context, it
appears to mean that the "property" need not be the trade secrets themselves,
but what this "other" property may be is unclear. One reading is that it refers
to the tangible property in which some trade secrets reside, perhaps those
"goods and services" to which the trade secrets must be related for
jurisdictional purposes. Another, broader reading is that "property" refers
to any personal property that may be used for the "propagation" or
"dissemination" oftrade secrets including, for instance, paper copies, digital
storage devices, computers, cell phones, and copy machines.

3. Whistleblower Provision
Both federal and state law exists to encourage individuals, usually
employees of companies, to report suspected violations of law, including

383. See 000 Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov, No. 5:17-cv-00017-EJD, 2017 WL
67119 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017) (denying an ex parte seizure under DTSA because other
legal obligations, including a preservation order requiring delivery of a company-issued
laptop at a court hearing rendered a seizure unnecessary).
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fraud in government contracting. 384 Known as "whistleblowers," these
individuals are often sued for trade secret misappropriation related to their
disclosure of information concerning the illegal activity. To limit such
claims, the DTSA's whistleblower provision was added late in the
legislative process, but it was not subject to a public hearing with testimony
on the provision's merits. 385 As a result, there was no opportunity to identify
and address potential ambiguities that exist in its wording, leaving
potentially significant work for federal courts in the future.
As with most of the "new" provisions of the DTSA, the whistleblower
provision contains few statutory definitions, meaning that the general rule
of applying common meanings should apply, unless some other canon of
statutory interpretation counsels otherwise. However, there are features of
the whistleblower provision that suggest that federal courts will have greater
leeway to interpret it without reference to state law and to make specialized
federal common law to fill any necessary gaps. First, there is the strong
federal policy that the whistleblower provision reflects-namely, to
facilitate disclosure of illegal conduct. 386 Second, application of the
whistleblower provision to all federal and state civil and criminal actions
for trade secret misappropriation demonstrates a preemptive federal
purpose. 387 This interpretation is bolstered by the language of the DTSA,
which states: "Except as provided in section 1833(b) [the whistleblower
provision], this chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace any
other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States
Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the
misappropriation of a trade secret ...." 388
384. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2012).
385. The provision was based upon a draft of an article that Peter S. Menell first
publicly disseminated in late 2015. See Menell, supra note 135. Once a draft of his article
became public, Professor Menell was contacted by the offices of Senators Leahy and
Grassley, and thereafter the language he proposed in his draft paper was added to the DTSA
as a "manager's amendment" in January 2016. See James Pooley, What You Need to Know
About the Amended Defend Trade Secrets Act, PATENTLY-0 (Jan. 31, 2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/01/amended-defend-secrets.html. Since this particular
amendment was made at an Executive Business Meeting of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and not at a public hearing where testimony could be taken, there is little public
legislative history to explain the thinking behind the amendment or its numerous undefined
terms. But Professor Menell has recently written an article explaining the provision's
intent. See Peter S. Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend
Trade Secrets Act, 1 NEV. L.J. FORUM 92 (2017).
386. Menell, supra note 135.
387. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
388. Id. § 1838.
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Because the whistleblower provision was adopted with little notice, it is
unclear from the legislative history whether its provisions are modeled after
other federal laws, including other federal laws governing whistleblower
activity. Thus, it cannot be definitively stated that the borrowed statute rule
or the in para materia canon of construction will be used to interpret the
DTSA. However, since some of the terminology that is used in the DTSA's
whistleblower provision is similar to terminology used in other federal
whistleblower laws, it seems likely that federal courts will at least look at
those other laws for guidance. For instance, there is a significant body of
jurisprudence under the False Claims Act (FCA) which defines "public
disclosure" and ''under seal. " 389
A critical part of the whistleblower provision requires that a
"disclosure" oftrade secret information must be "in confidence" and "solely
for the purpose ofreporting or investigating a suspected violation oflaw." 390
However, this terminology is not defined in the DTSA and, in context,
seems likely to be interpreted differently than similar language in the FCA
which focuses on specific types of disclosures instead of all "public"
disclosures. Indeed, the terms "in confidence" and "disclosure" can mean
different things in different contexts, even in trade secret cases. 391
Consequently, their meanings in the DTSA are likely to be litigated because
failure to comply with the whistleblower provision's requirements means
that immunity from trade secret liability does not apply. 392
Pursuant to general principles of trade secret law, the term "disclosure"
is used in at least two senses: (1) to refer to acts that result in the loss of
trade secrecy (and thus may create liability for misappropriation); and (2)
to refer to the transfer of information between parties in the context of a
389. On the issue of"public disclosure" see, for example, United States ex rel. Moore
& Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2016). With respect to the
"under seal" requirement, see, for example, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United

States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436 (2016). See also ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDJNGS: A POCKET GUIDE (2010)
(explaining when and how court documents can be sealed).
390. 18 U.S.C. § 1833 (Supp. IV 2016).
391. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows and the
Implications ofCloud Computing/or Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 64
78 (2014) (detailing the different meanings of disclosure under U.S. intellectual property
laws).
392. The meaning of"public disclosure" in False Claims Act cases was highly litigated
until Congress amended the FCA to more clearly define and limit the meaning of public
disclosure. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), amending 31U.S.C.§3730(e)(4)
(2012).
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confidential relationship, an act that usually does not result in a loss of trade
secrecy. 393 Given the context and purpose of the whistleblower provision,
including its "in confidence" requirement, it seems logical to define
"disclosure" in the second sense to require whistleblowers to keep the
information of wrongdoing that they "disclose" confidential. But nowhere
in the DTSA is "in confidence" specifically defined. Under well
established principles of trade secret law, to disclose things "in confidence"
means to share trade secrets only when the recipient of the information is
under a duty of confidentiality. 394 However, this may be too strict a
requirement for whistleblower purposes as the allowed recipients of the
information may not owe a formal duty of confidence, and it may be
difficult for the whistleblower to secure an express confidentiality
agreement, for instance from law enforcement personnel, prior to disclosing
any information.
The clause that requires that a disclosure of trade secret occur "solely"
for a specified purpose is also not fully explained in the statutory text. This
clause was interpreted narrowly by one court, treating it as an affirmative
defense that requires clear proof that the defendant satisfied the requirement
before dismissing a complaint395-a conclusion with which Professor Peter
Menell has expressed strong disagreement. 396 There is little doubt that the
whistleblower immunity is a "defense" in the sense that it is an argument
that a defendant charged with civil or criminal trade secret misappropriation
would likely raise, probably labeling it as an "affirmative defense" in an
answer to a civil complaint. The critical question, however, is whether it can
also serve as the basis for a quick resolution of a trade secret
misappropriation lawsuit, such as pursuant to a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment. This is a problem that federal courts have
struggled with concerning the immunity provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, 397 without a definitive answer more than twenty years
after that statute was adopted, in part because the applicable scope of the
immunity is unclear, but also because the application of immunity is often
highly fact-dependent. 398 On one hand, providing defendants an easy and
low-cost way to terminate litigation is consistent with the underlying
purpose of whistleblower immunity, but because the immunity is based
393. See Sandeen, supra note 391, at 64.
394. Id.
395. Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143, 147 (D. Mass. 2016).
396. Menell, supra note 385.
397. 47 u.s.c. § 230 (2012).
398. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing a lower
court order dismissing all of plaintiffs claims).
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upon a number of factual predicates that may be disputed, this may prevent
an early dismissal of litigation.
The notice and liability limiting parts of the whistleblower provision
also lack clarity. Although it is clear that some sort of notice to employees
is required, the necessary form of notice is muddled with respect to what
employees must be given notice of. The "general" requirement is that: "An
employer shall provide notice of the immunity set forth in this subsection
in any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a
trade secret or other confidential information." 399 But this notice
requirement is waived if the employer simply "provides a cross-reference
to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer's
reporting policy for a suspected violation of law." 400 Thus, when read in
context, it does not appear that the cross-reference must include notice of
the immunity, only notice ofwhistleblowing opportunities.
While federal courts interpreting the whistleblower provision are likely
to feel greater freedom to apply federal standards and make federal common
law, they should consult applicable state law for meaning because the
whistleblower provision uses terms of art that are well known under state
trade secrets law. This is particularly true for the definition of a confidential
relationship because this body oflaw may help to define the meaning of "in
confidence" in a way that ensures that the sharing of trade secrets with
"Federal, State, or local government officials" does not constitute a waiver
of trade secret protection. Additionally, because the "Rule of Construction"
at the end of the whistleblower section directs federal courts to consider
what constitutes "an act that is otherwise prohibited by law, such as the
unlawful access of material by unauthorized means," both federal and state
law should also be consulted.

4. Limitations on Scope ofInjunctive Relief, Including
Enforceability ofNoncompete Agreements and the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine
The passage of the DTSA creates a potential conflict between the
enforcement of federal trade secret rights and state laws governing
employee mobility and restrictive covenants. In light of the Erie doctrine
and the Supreme Court's preference for the law of the forum state when
filling gaps, it was likely that federal courts would have applied the
employee mobility and restrictive covenant laws of the forum state, but it
399. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2016).
400. Id. § l 833(b)(3)(B).
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was not a foregone conclusion. Without specific language to such effect,
federal courts might have interpreted the DTSA to implicitly preempt or
preclude application of such laws. 401 Based upon applicable case law
discussed in Part III, it would all depend upon whether the state law unduly
conflicted with the federal statute. 402
Fortunately, Congress amended early drafts of the DTSA to include a
provision that makes it clear that state law principles must be applied with
respect to the issuance of an injunction, thereby explicitly incorporating by
reference a body of law that will continue to evolve at the state level.403
Specifically, this provision states that a court may not grant an injunction
that: "(I) prevent[ s] a person from entering into an employment relationship,
and that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence
of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the ..
person knows; or (II) otherwise conflict[s] with an applicable State law
prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or
business. " 404 Thus, federal courts are likely to limit the scope of injunctive
relief against employees, particularly in cases where there is no evidence of
actual or threatened disclosure or use of misappropriated trade secrets.
But there is enough ambiguity in how the injunction provision of the
DTSA is written to contend that it also represents a decision by Congress to
limit or reject the "inevitable disclosure doctrine" that is recognized in some
states. 405 This ambiguity arises from the language that states that an
injunction must be "based on evidence of actual of threatened
misappropriation and not merely on the information the person knows."406
In states where application of the inevitable disclosure argument is allowed
to substitute for evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation, this
language appears to differ from state law. But it might also be read to allow
the inevitable disclosure argument to be considered, as long as some other
evidence of actual or threatened misappropriation is presented.

401. See Professors' 2014 Letter, supra note 160.
402. Cf Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1392 (D.N.J.
1986), rev'd, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986) ("In sum, it would do violence to the delicate
balance of power struck by the supremacy clause to hold that the tangential federal interest
in trademark uniformity preempts the principled state interest in eliminating discrimination
which is at issue here.").
403. See supra Part II.
404. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2016).
405. See Elizabeth A. Rowe & Sharon K. Sandeen, Debating Noncompetes and Trade
Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 438, 451 (2017).
406. Id.
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Another significant issue with respect to limitations on injunctive relief
is which state's law counts as the "applicable State law prohibiting restraints
on the practice of a lawful profession, trade or business."407 Ordinarily, one
would anticipate that if an employment agreement specifies a particular
state's law shall apply, federal courts will honor that choice. But this is
complicated by the fact that some states, like California, refuse to enforce
contractual provisions that purport to require application of another state's
noncompete law to an employee whose site of employment is located within
the state. 408 And if the employment agreement is silent, and the employer
and current or former employee are located in different states that have
different positions on the inevitable disclosure doctrine (e.g., a Maryland
resident who works in Delaware), 409 then courts will be compelled to
determine which state law will govem. 410 In other words, this provision may
continue the lack of uniformity that currently exists under state law with
respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, but add additional layers of
complexity by forcing courts to engage in choice-of-law decisions.

5. Extraterritoriality Provision
The extraterritoriality provision of the DTSA is "new" in the sense that
it is not derived from the state law of trade secrecy, but it is also "old" in
the sense that it predates the DTSA because it was part of the EEA as
originally adopted. 411 Section 1837 provides that:
This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United
States if
(1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent
resident alien of the United States, or an organization organized
407. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(II) (Supp. IV 2016).
408. CAL. LAB. CODE§ 925 (West 2016).
409. Compare LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451 (Md. 2004) (rejecting
the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a matter of Maryland law), with E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964) (recognizing
"inevitable disclosure" as justifying injunctive relief "against a threatened use or
disclosure" of a trade secret).
410. See, e.g., First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, No. 16-CV-1961-WJM-MJW,
2016 WL 8358549 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2016), rev'd on other grounds, 874 F.3d 1136 (10th
Cir. 2017) (applying choice of law rules, concluding that Colorado law rather than
California law applied, and granting an "injunction that accomplishes the same result as a
noncompete provision").
411. For a discussion of the extraterritoriality issue before the adoption of the DTSA,
see Elizabeth Rowe & Daniel Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66
ALA. L. REV. 63 (2014).
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under the laws of the United States or a State or political
subdivision thereof; or
(2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the
United States.

Although this provision has been on the books for over twenty years, there
is not much case law interpreting it. Moreover, as Robin Effron has argued,
the expansion of this statute to include civil as well as criminal claims of
extraterritorial trade secret theft creates serious issues regarding personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants and applicability of the forum non
conveniens doctrine. 412
In terms of statutory interpretation, the first subsections of the
extraterritoriality provision contain terms that are likely to be reasonably
well understood with reference to other provisions of federal law-for
example, whether an individual is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident, or whether an organization (e.g., a corporation, partnership, or
other collective entity) is organized under U.S. or state law. The criminal
law-type language in the second subsection--e.g., "act in furtherance" and
"offense" (rather than violation)-suggests that courts will look to
comparable federal criminal law to understand these terms, including the
law of conspiracy. It is unclear, however, whether criminal law rules of
statutory interpretation like the rule of lenity might also be applied.

6. Construction with Other Laws
The construction with other laws provision of the DTSA is significant
because it provides that "this chapter shall not be construed to preempt or
displace any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United
States Federal, State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the
misappropriation of a trade secret."413 This explicit statement, coupled with
the nonexclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, means that state trade
secret law (as well as other state law causes of action) will coexist with the
DTSA, which makes sense when one considers the limited scope of the
DTSA's jurisdictional provision. 414 But not only does the provision state
412. Robin Effron, Trade Secrets, Extraterritoriality, and Jurisdiction, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 765 (2016); cf Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic

Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419 (2016) (critiquing expansion and enforcement of the EEA).
413. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
414. See supra Section IV.A.I. Indeed, one empirical study of trade secret litigation in
federal court under the DTSA has found that the vast majority of plaintiffs have asserted
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that the DTSA does not preempt other remedies, it also states that it does
not "displace" state remedies. This can, and probably will be, read as
specific direction by Congress that state law should be used when filling
gaps in the DTSA, at least with respect to the portions of the DTSA for
which there are analogous provisions of state law. In most but not all states,
this means the UTSA. 415 Ofparticular significance is section 7 of the UTSA,
which limits available claims for trade secret misappropriation to trade
secret claims and breach of contract actions. 416
B.

INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE "BORROWED" AND DEFINED
LANGUAGE

The language of the DTSA that was taken directly from the UTSA, and
which is also defined in the UTSA, presents the clearest case for federal
courts to look to state law to fill gaps and, possibly, to interpret and apply
such language. This is because by adopting the exact (or nearly exact)
language of the UTSA, it can be assumed that Congress intended that
language to be interpreted and applied in the same manner as it is interpreted
and applied by state courts. 417 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in
Molzof v. United States:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them. 418

both federal and state trade secret misappropriation claims. See David S. Levine &
Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(finding that over 80% of complaints alleging a DTSA claim also allege trade secret
misappropriation under state law)
415. See supra note 5 (noting that all states except Massachusetts, New York, and
North Carolina have adopted some version of the UTSA).
416. UTSA § 7; see also generally John Cross, UTSA Displacement of Other State
Law Claims, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 445 (2011).
417. See supra Section 11.E (legislative history).
418. 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263
(1952)).
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The borrowed provisions of the DTSA include: ( 1) the definition of a "trade
secret;" (2) the definition of "misappropriation;" and (3) the definition of
"improper means."
Even though the DTSA, like the UTSA, contains a definition section,
there will still be significant work for federal courts in deciding the meaning
and scope of these terms because the definitions themselves include
language that is not clearly defined. In addition, some issues of
interpretation remain unresolved at the state level. For instance, the meaning
of the independent economic value requirement is neither well-developed
nor clear. 419 Furthermore, although amendments to the EEA's preexisting
definition of a trade secret were made by the DTSA to conform it more
closely to the UTSA's definition, some differences continue to exist and
may result in slightly different sets of information being protectable as trade
secrets under the DTSA and applicable state law. Also, because the DTSA
is technically an amendment to the preexisting EEA, and the EEA is a
criminal statute, case law interpreting terms and provisions in the EEA will
arguably apply when interpreting the DTSA. Because of the rule of lenity,
this sets up a potential conflict between how the EEA and UTSA define the
same terms.

1. Definition of "Trade Secret"
The DTSA definition of a "trade secret" is partly a carryover from the
EEA and partly a DTSA amendment that more closely aligns its language
with the UTSA. It is identical to the definition that is contained in the UTSA
with the exception of the scope of applicable "information." Specifically,
whereas the UTSA refers to any "information," the DTSA lists only specific
types of information that may qualify as a trade secret. Thus, on the face of
the statute, it appears that the types of information that are protected by the
DTSA are not coextensive with the types of information that are protected
under the UTSA. But whether a federal court reads the DTSA's definition
to apply to a narrower set of information than the UTSA will depend upon
how the court interprets the fust part of the definition and whether the rule
of lenity will be applied. As a practical matter, it will also depend upon the
actual cases presented and whether an argument can be made that they do
not involve "financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information." For instance, how would information in the form
of an idea for a television show or a movie be classified? Is it "business
information," or is it literary and artistic information that is not listed in the

419. See Johnson, supra note 193, at 557-58.
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DTSA? Although the listed categories are broad, conceptually there may be
information that is not covered by the DTSA that would be covered by the
UTSA, particularly since the Commerce Clause provision also requires that
the information be "related to a good or service used, or intended for use, in
interstate or foreign commerce."
Embedded in the definition of a trade secret is terminology that is well
understood under state trade secret law and the UTSA, but that is not
defined in the DTSA, including the meanings of: (a) "generally known;" (b)
"readily ascertainable;" and (c) "reasonable efforts (measures) to maintain
secrecy." If federal courts stick strictly to the language of the DTSA without
applying the borrowed statute rule or common law, it is possible that such
terms will be interpreted and applied in a manner that is at odds with state
law. But if the borrowed statute rule and canon of construction that favors
the common law are applied, then the DTSA's definition of a trade secret
will be applied consistent with the laws of most, if not all, states.
The potential for non-uniform definitions of key trade secret concepts
is not insignificant given the specialized meaning that many of these
concepts have under the UTSA and applicable state law. For instance,
"generally known" under the UTSA and the common law of trade secrecy
is not limited to information that is widely known by members ofthe public,
but can include information that is only widely known within a particular
industry. 420 Similarly, the concept of "readily ascertainable" under the
UTSA generally means that information can be easily found in publicly
available publications or goods, 421 but it is subject to differing applications
in practice due to the variability of conceptions of "readily." The rule under
the UTSA is that if information is readily ascertainable, then it is not a trade
secret in the first instance; if it is not readily ascertainable, then the process
of learning the information from public sources may constitute "proper"
reverse engmeenng.
The "independent economic value" requirement is not defined in the
UTSA and, indeed, it is not well-understood or theorized in the cases. The
UTSA' s drafting history suggest this requirement was intended as an
important limitation on the scope of protectable information,422 but it has
not been applied satisfactorily in many cases, leaving the federal courts
without much meaningful guidance regarding its meaning. However, if the

420. UTSA § 1 cmt.
421. Id.
422. Sandeen, supra note 4.
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federal courts simply apply it as it is written, giving meaning to all of its
words, then it may actually be applied as it was intended. In this regard, the
statute does not simply require any economic value, but a specific type;
namely, "independent" economic value "to others" because of its
secrecy. 423

2. Definition of "Misappropriation"
The definition of misappropriation contained in the DTSA was not in
the original version of the EEA, but was added with the other "new"
provisions of the DTSA and was borrowed word for word from the UTSA.
As in the UTSA, it is a very convoluted provision which defines the
following: (1) the various "wrongs" of trade secret misrepresentation, (2)
the state of mind that misappropriators must have, and (3) potential third- ~
party liability. Significant portions ofthe definition of misappropriation rely
upon unidentified state law (which in effect are incorporated by reference),
including legal and ethical principles that define "improper means" and
duties of confidence. This includes principles of contract law which
determine when express and implied duties of confidentiality are created
and legal principles governing duties of confidence as "a matter of law."
Because application of the statutory definition of misappropriation
relies heavily upon concepts of state law-and those concepts are not
themselves defined in either the DTSA or the UTSA--consistent with the .,
rules and methodologies previously discussed, it is likely that they will be
interpreted and applied in accordance with the law of the forum state. Such
a prediction is bolstered by the fact that these concepts are usually based
upon the values and ethics of individual states and often define the
expectations of parties doing business in those states. But, as occurred in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the possibility exists that the
federal courts may use a general source of law, like common law as
expressed in the Restatements, to make the necessary federal common law.

3. Definition of "Improper Means"
The definition of "improper means" in the DTSA, as in the UTSA,
includes an illustrative list of criminal and tortious behaviors that, when
engaged in for the purpose of either wrongfully acquiring or wrongfully
disclosing or using a trade secret, constitute "misappropriation." The
precise meaning and scope of "improper means" has not been definitively
settled under state law, although many courts and commentators have cited
423. See Johnson, supra note 193, at 556-58.
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E.I. duPont deNemours Co. v. Christopher424 for the propos1t10n that
"improper means" can include behavior that is not itself a crime, a tort, or a
breach of contract, as the language of both the DTSA and UTSA seem to
require. Thus, trade secret defendants are likely to urge a definition of
"improper means" that requires the commission of specific criminal or
tortious behaviors, whereas trade secret owners are apt to urge a broader
definition. If federal courts apply the law of the forum state, Christopher
will apply in Texas and other states where it has been recognized with favor.
But if they decide to apply the "plain meaning" of the DTSA, a narrower
construction is possible. This example suggests that despite the DTSA's
objective of uniformity, local variation may continue to exist in some areas.
C.

INTERPRETING AND APPLYING "BORROWED" LANGUAGE THAT Is
NOT DEFINED

There are numerous provisions of the DTSA that were borrowed from
the UTSA but that are not defined in either the DTSA or the UTSA. At the
state level, these provisions are subject to interpretation by state courts, and
there is a rich body of case decisions defining them. The question is whether
and to what extent federal courts applying the same language in the DTSA
will consult and apply state jurisprudence on these issues.
Applying the foregoing rules and methodologies, it is hard to predict
how federal courts will rule with respect to language borrowed from the
UTSA but not defined in the DTSA. On one hand, preference for national
uniformity would suggest a desire for a single, national standard,
particularly since the legislative history of the DTSA is rife with statements
about the need for uniformity in trade secret law. 425 On the other hand, it is
clear that the DTSA, particularly the borrowed parts, is based upon both
state common law and state statutes that adopted the UTSA. But without
defined terms "giving content" to the DTSA, will the federal courts first
apply the "plain meaning" of the terms used or look to judicial decisions
from states to define the terms? If the latter, will they look to the rules of
decision of the forum state, or, like the court did in Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, the "better reasoned" common law, regardless of whether
the forum state has adopted such an interpretation?
In the case of the issues listed below, it is not so much that the DTSA
does not "cover" them, but that without any statutory definition or
associated commentary (as exists in the case of the UTSA) it is unclear
whether federal courts can (and should) interpret those terms anew or apply
424. 431F.2d1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
425. See supra Part II.
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the meaning of those terms as developed under state law. Moreover, to the
extent that federal courts decide to apply state law, what happens if there is
a conflict in interpretation between various states? In the subsections which
follow, we briefly explore what the various approaches may mean for the
following issues that are not defined by either the UTSA or the DTSA.
1. What Constitutes a Duty ofConfidentiality and How Are Such
Duties Farmed?
Under the law of most states, duties of confidentiality can be created in
a variety of ways. They can be defined by statutes, professional norms, or
contract. Except where a statute of frauds might apply, the creation of
contractual duties of confidentiality can be either written or oral and express
or implied-in-fact. 426 Pursuant to principles of equity, they might also be
"implied-at-law." However, there is an important distinction under the
UTSA and the law ofthe states that federal courts should keep in mind when
examining the confidentiality prong of trade secret misappropriation
. namely, a trade secret claim based upon an alleged breach of a duty of
confidence versus other tort or contract claims based upon that same duty.
The UTSA, and by extension the DTSA, only applies to the
misappropriation of trade secrets. Any supplemental claims will be
governed by state law, including state law claims that would otherwise be
precluded by section 7 of the UTSA. In other words, section 7 of the UST A _
limits state-law claims for misappropriation of "competitively significant
information. " 427 However, the DTSA, due to its lack of preemption, does
not (on its face) bar non-precluded state law claims being heard in federal
court under supplemental jurisdiction.
2. What Constitutes "Know or Reason to Know, " and What Needs
to Be Known: The Trade Secrets; The Misappropriation; or
Both?
A largely unexplored and therefore unresolved issue among the states
concerns the precise "knowledge" that is needed by an alleged trade secret
426. See, e.g., Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 679 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("While
an express confidentiality agreement may certainly suffice to define the duty of
confidentiality necessary for action under [the Illinois UTSA], the existence of such an
agreement is not a prerequisite to such an action. Rather a duty of confidentiality may be
implied from the circumstances surrounding the parties' relationship.") (internal citations
omitted).
427. See UTSA § 7 cmt. ("This Act ... applies to a duty to protect competitively
significant secret information that is imposed by law. It does not apply to a duty voluntarily
assumed through an express or implied-in-fact contract.").
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misappropriator, particularly when the alleged misappropriator is a third
party who was not involved in the initial misappropriation. Does the alleged
misappropriator need to know that actual trade secrets exist, or just that the
information in question was the subject of some efforts to keep it private?
Must they also understand that their behavior constitutes misappropriation?
This relates to the notice function of the reasonable efforts requirement
which, according to some courts, should at least put employees and others
on notice of the desire for confidentiality and the identity of confidential
information.

3. What Constitutes "Willful and Malicious" and "Bad Faith" for
the Award ofPunitive Damages and Attorneys Fees?
Both the UTSA and DTSA authorize an award of exemplary damages
for willful and malicious misappropriation. In addition, such conduct may
be the basis for awarding attorney's fees under both the UTSA and DTSA.
Further, if a plaintiff alleges trade secret misappropriation in "bad faith," it
may also be subject to an award of attorney's fees. However, neither the
DTSA nor the UTSA attempt to expressly define these requirements.
Federal courts applying the DTSA have several options in interpreting
these provisions, not all ofwhich are mutually exclusive. First, they can tum
to the body of state law that has developed under the UTSA, which provides
considerable guidance as to what types of conduct satisfies these
standards. 428 Second, they can apply the (more limited) federal court
precedents applying state trade secret law for actions heard under the courts'
diversity jurisdiction prior to the DTSA. 429 Third, the courts might seek
guidance from other federal statutes, such as the bankruptcy code provision
that willful and malicious injury to property cannot be the basis for
428. See, e.g., Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, No. CIV. A. 3512-VCS, 2010 WL
610725, at *34 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010) (finding that the defendants "acted willfully and
maliciously with intent to cause commercial harm ... by using [the plaintiffs] confidential
information and trade secrets" and awarding attorney's fees); Boeing Co. v. Sierracin
Corp., 738 P.2d 665, 684 (Wash. 1987) (affirming trial court's finding of willful and
malicious misappropriation of Boeing's trade secrets and its award of exemplary damages
and attorney fees).
429. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-58,
2011 WL 5872895, at *l (E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2011) (awarding $350,000 for defendant's
willful and malicious misappropriation under Virginia's UTSA); Astro-Med, Inc. v. Plant,
No. CIV.A. 06-533 ML, 2008 WL 2883769, at *6 (D.R.I. July 25, 2008), amended in part,
No. CIV. A. 06-533 ML, 2010 WL 537101 (D.R.I. Feb. 12, 2010) (awarding exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and costs due to defendant's willful and malicious
misappropriation of trade secrets under Rhode Island's UTSA).
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discharging a debt, in order to determine what mental state is sufficient. 430
For the sake of consistency with the UTSA, some combination of the first
two options are most likely to be adopted by federal courts.

4. What Are the Measures ofActual Loss and Unjust Enrichment?
When Are Royalties in Lieu ofInjunctions to be Granted, and
How Should They Be Calculated?
Another set of questions relates to monetary remedies available under
the DTSA. Both the DTSA and UTSA authorize a successful trade secret
plaintiff to recover its actual loss caused by the misappropriation, as well as
the misappropriator's unjust enrichment (i.e., disgorgement) to the extent
that it is not included in calculations of the plaintiff's loss (in order to avoid
double counting). Similar language exists under other federal statutes, ..
including the Copyright Act431 and the Lanham Act. 432 Again, the federal ·
courts will be confronted with the choice of whether to rely on existing
precedent under state trade secret law, on federal court interpretations of
other federal intellectual property statutes, or some combination of these
options. Federal courts will also be faced with questions about how to
determine such monetary remedies, such as whether the principle of
apportionment-which is well recognized in patent law-should be applied
to prevent a successful trade secret plaintiff from benefitting from
innovations and developments unrelated to the plaintiff's trade secret _
information. 433
A similar situation exists with respect to awarding royalties in the
(presumably rare) event that an injunction is not awarded to prevent future
misappropriation. Federal courts could tum to either existing precedent
under the UTSA, or they could tum to other bodies of federal law, such as
patent law, to help guide this analysis. 434
430. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
431. 17 u.s.c. § 504 (2012).
432. 15 u.s.c. § 1117 (2012).
433. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Application of Patent Law Damages Analysis to
Trade Secret Misappropriation Claims: Apportionment, Alternatives, and Other Common
Limitations on Damages, 25 SEATILE U. L. REV. 821 (2002).
434. See, e.g., Richard F. Dole, Jr., Statutory Royalty Damages Under the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act and the Federal Patent Code, 16 V AND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 223 (2014)
(arguing that differences between the Patent Act and trade secret laws should counsel
against adopting the Patent Act's approach to statutory royalty awards); cf Christopher B.
Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay: An Empirical Assessment and
Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203 (2015) (discussing royalty awards
granted in lieu of injunctive relief in patent cases).
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D.

DEALING WITH ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESSED BY THE DTSA

Finally, over the decades since the recognition of trade secret claims in
the United States, a number of issues have arisen that are not addressed in
either the DTSA or the UTSA. This includes the long-standing common
law concept of "general skill and knowledge," which is not mentioned in
the text of the DTSA, but which is an important limitation on the scope of
trade secret protection. 435 It also includes the law governing the ownership
of employee-created trade secrets. There are also other unaddressed issues
that are procedural or remedial in nature. They include the following
questions:
•

Are monetary damages available if there was no use or
disclosure of the trade secrets?

•

Is irreparable harm presumed from a finding of likelihood of
success on the merits?

•

Does the reasoning of eBay436 apply to injunctive relief under
the DTSA?

•

What constitutes a sufficient public policy interest to require
royalties in lieu of an injunction?

•

When is trade secret misappropriation deemed to be
"discovered" such that the statute oflimitations begins to run?

•

How should conflicts between federal patent, copyright, and
trade secret law be resolved?

•

Who has standing to bring a claim under the DTSA?

Since the foregoing questions primarily concern the standards for the grant
of remedies, including injunctive relief, they are likely to be governed by
the extensive body of federal jurisprudence, based upon the Constitution,
statutes, and principles of equity, concerning remedies. But as issues arise,
federal courts may look toward state law for guidance and, with respect to
procedural matters, will have more flexibility to do so.

435. See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1267 (3d Cir. 1985)
("[A]n employee's general knowledge, skill, and experience are not trade secrets. Thus in
theory an employer generally may not inhibit the manner in which an employee uses his or
her knowledge, skill, and experience---even if these were acquired during employment.")
(internal citations omitted).
436. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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CONCLUSION

In summary, federal courts will face difficult and complex issues
regarding the role of existing federal and state law in interpreting and
applying the DTSA. Federal jurisprudence will first be based upon the
language of the DTSA itself, as interpreted by the federal courts. But state
law will likely play an important role as well, either through statutory
interpretation or common law rulemaking as necessary to fill gaps in the
DTSA. Based upon the interpretive rules and methodologies previously
discussed, possible scenarios for the DTSA include federal courts: (1)
adopting the law of the forum state, including the UTSA as adopted and
applied in that state; (2) rejecting the law of the forum state in favor of the
creation of a federal common law based upon (a) some other state's UTSA
law, (b) the UTSA and its commentary, (c) the common law of trade
secrecy; or (3) whatever the federal courts think should be the law. No
matter what choices the federal courts make, the development of a federal
jurisprudence of trade secret law will generate numerous issues in need of
further consideration and possible legislative fixes.
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